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Abstract
This report considers the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to
the problem of misuse detection and misuse localisation within telecommunica-
tions environments. A broad survey of techniques is provided, that covers inter alia
rule based systems, model-based systems, case based reasoning, pattern matching,
clustering and feature extraction, artificial neural networks, genetic algorithms, ar-
tificial immune systems, agent based systems, data mining and a variety of hybrid
approaches. The report then considers the central issue of event correlation, that
is at the heart of many misuse detection and localisation systems. The notion of
being able to infer misuse by the correlation of individual temporally distributed
events within a multiple data stream environment is explored, and a range of tech-
niques, covering model based approaches, ‘programmed’ AI and machine learning
paradigms. It is found that, in general, correlation is best achieved via rule based ap-
proaches, but that these suffer from a number of drawbacks, such as the difficulty of
developing and maintaining an appropriate knowledge base, and the lack of ability
to generalise from known misuses to new unseen misuses. Two distinct approaches
are evident. One attempts to encode knowledge of known misuses, typically within
rules, and use this to screen events. This approach cannot generally detect misuses
for which it has not been programmed, i.e. it is prone to issuing false negatives.
The other attempts to ‘learn’ the features of event patterns that constitute normal
behaviour, and, by observing patterns that do not match expected behaviour, de-
tect when a misuse has occurred. This approach is prone to issuing false positives,
i.e. inferring misuse from innocent patterns of behaviour that the system was not
trained to recognise. Contemporary approaches are seen to favour hybridisation,
often combining detection or localisation mechanisms for both abnormal and nor-
mal behaviour, the former to capture known cases of misuse, the latter to capture
unknown cases. In some systems, these mechanisms even work together to update
each other to increase detection rates and lower false positive rates. It is concluded
that hybridisation offers the most promising future direction, but that a rule or state
based component is likely to remain, being the most natural approach to the cor-
relation of complex events. The challenge, then, is to mitigate the weaknesses of
canonical programmed systems such that learning, generalisation and adaptation
are more readily facilitated.
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This report reviews the application of techniques drawn from the domain of Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AI) for the detection and localisation of misuse events within
telecommunications environments. The underlying premise is that systems cur-
rently deployed in real networks are fundamentally rule based systems. It is given
that these suffer from drawbacks such as poor generalisation and adaptability. The
purpose of this work is to confirm these premises and identify techniques from the
domain of AI that could be applied to misuse detection and, in particular, the cor-
relation of high level alarms from network resources, with a view to addressing the
perceived weaknesses of rule based systems. The report considers a broad range of
techniques and application scenarios from low-level intrusion detection (e.g., based
on analysis of TCP/IP packets) to correlation of high level alarms from network
resources. Event correlation is treated in detail, with reference to both the academic
literature and existing systems. Further, the authors distinguish between misuse de-
tection approaches and misuse localisation techniques, which are also treated in this
report.
It is worth noting that the MDS project focusses on four broad classifications of mis-
use – Fraud Detection(FM), Fault Management (FM), Performance Management
(PM), and Business Processes (BP) – within the domain of telecommunications
networks. However, the primary purpose of this review is to identify application
techniques for event correlation, and hence a broader range of literature is consid-
ered. It is found that the majority of literature considers misuse (often specifically
intrusion detection) within computer networks. There is relatively little literature
concerning the misuse areas considered by MDS, however, the techniques exam-
ined here are considered equally applicable to the MDS project.
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1.2 Misuse Detection and Localisation
The term ‘misuse’ is herein defined in a broad sense as the use or behaviour of a
networked environment in any way that is not consistent with the system’s expected
functionality, as perceived by the provider of the network service. This definition
covers a range of possible misuses related to inter alia fraud, business processes,
performance, and system faults. This work focusses on the detection of such misuse
events. The misuse is often that of unauthorised access of the system or using
the system in an unauthorised way. In this case, the detection of such events is
usually referred to as ‘intrusion detection’ and the protection mechanism is called
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
This report considers the specific detection mechanism – typically an event corre-
lation engine – that examines events occurring within the networked environment
and attempts to classify these events, or patterns of events, as representing either
normal or abnormal behaviours. It also goes one step further discusses some local-
isation techniques which are used to localise a misuse in the network and to name
its root cause. A broad range of misuse scenarios from the literature are examined.
In addition, this report considers the correlation of alarms from network resources
that may be indicative of a misuse of some kind.
It is assumed that the detection mechanism reside within a larger system – the ‘Mis-
use Detection System’ (MDS) – that interfaces with the networked environment and
has overall responsibility for the gathering of events, presentation to the detection
mechanism, and processing of the results. On occasion, alarms are raised by vari-
ous network resources. These may indicate misuse of the system in some fashion.
In many cases, many alarms will be created relating to the same act of misuse. It
is possible that these many not be synchronised within a short time period and may
even be interleaved with other alarms indicating entirely different misuse activity.
The particular protection mechanism considered within this report is that which
would form a smaller part of a larger mechanism and assumes that:
• Data in the form of alarms is available as input.
• There could be many such streams of alarm data arriving in parallel.
• Alarms could be indicated within different streams in different ways.
• Alarms may be related to the same misuse act but could arrive in different
streams at different times.
Following the identification of a misuse, the task is to locate the precise source in a
process generally referred to as misuse localisation. This is particular prevalent in
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the context of fault or performance problems. Most localisation approaches assume
that further domain specific knowledge is available, typically relying on network
topology or the specification of failure classes. However, there are some approaches
that try to deduce this knowledge from the network itself. For localisation this
knowledge is needed because the root cause of a misuse has to be named and has to
be inferred from the alarms available. Sometimes the faulty network element does
not even generate an alarm due to its unavailability. Then it is important to have
something like failure dependencies between the network elements to deduce the
original root cause.
At this point it is worthwhile clarifying the difference between an IDS or MDS and
a firewall. A firewall will forbid access to a system via a network according to a
set of predefined rules and conditions. Any network content that satisfies a subset
of these rules will be refused entrance to the system. A firewall must function at a
portal to a system and acts as a ‘doorman’ to the system by vetting potential entrants.
Anything suspicious is refused entrance. On the other hand an IDS or MDS detects
an intrusion or misuse after (or possibly during) its occurrence. Notice that an IDS
or MDS can also detect intrusions or misuses that originate from within the system
and as such it does not necessarily need to function at a system portal.
Figure 1.1 (adapted from Steinder and Sethi [199]) shows a coarse taxonomy of









Signature Based Anomaly Based
Detection Systems
Traditional AI
Figure 1.1: Overview of detection mechanisms
Detection mechanisms can therefore be classified as:
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• Signature based where the intrusion can be recognized by comparison with
known patterns. Somewhat confusingly, this is also often referred to as mis-
use detection. A database of known cases of misuse (signatures) is main-
tained and incoming events are compared with these signatures to determine
if they are representative of a misuse. The detection system would maintain
a large database of signatures, which could be updated as new misuses are
identified. Such systems are inherently limited by the size of the database and
as such are prone to issuing false negatives – i.e. indicating normal behaviour
for unknown misuses.
• Anomaly detection where a baseline of normal network activity is compiled
and deviations from this baseline then imply that an anomalous event has
occurred, and this is taken to be a misuse. Such a system can detect new
misuses provided that they are sufficiently different from normal behaviour.
Given the range of normal activity and the quantity of data involved, this type
of detection mechanism is prone to issuing false positives – i.e. indicating
abnormal behaviour for innocent events that deviate from known patterns of
activity.
Cuppens [43] describes these two approaches as behavioural referring to anomaly
detection and signature analysis referring to pattern recognition. Cuppens also ob-
serves the problems stated above, but further notes that attacks could be orchestrated
to occur very slowly, which can cause problems with anomaly detection systems,
and signature based systems can suffer simply by becoming out of date. Further,
signature based systems are typically pre-configured by experts based on domain
knowledge, whereas anomaly detection systems are expect to ‘learn’ what consti-
tutes normal traffic.
For the purpose of this report, we define the following terms:
• Misuse Use or behaviour of a networked environment in any way that is not
consistent with the system’s expected functionality.
• Misuse detection Following the convention of the literature, this is taken
to mean detection based specifically on identification of known misuses, i.e.
signature based as opposed to anomaly detection.
• Misuse Detection System (MDS) A system designed to detect instances of
misuse within a networked environment. When referred to as an MDS, it
is meant in the general sense, and not restricted to systems operating on the
misuse detection principle defined above.
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• Misuse localisation Also referred to as fault localisation, this refers to the
process of identifying the root cause of a misuse, e.g. naming a faulty network
element.
• Intrusion Subset of misuse concerned primarily with unauthorised access to
a system, or use of a system in an unauthorised way.
• Intrusion Detection System (IDS) A system designed to detect instances of
intrusion within a networked environment.
• Anomaly Behaviour of a system that departs from known normal behaviour
and may or may not constitute one or more instances of misuse.
• Anomaly detection Detection of misuses by identifying patterns of behaviour
that deviate from learnt patterns of normal behaviour.
1.3 Articial Intelligence
In this report, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is viewed as comprising a breadth of sys-
tems with the ability to learn, classify, adapt, and/or predict, to incorporate clas-
sical AI (e.g. symbolic AI and expert systems), related statistical techniques (e.g.
clustering and regression), and natural computing (e.g. artificial neural networks,
evolutionary computation, and swarm intelligence). In general, an understanding
of AI techniques is assumed. A brief introduction to some of the basic principles
of selected techniques of particular relevance to this report is included in chap-
ter 2. For further information, readers are referred to the following texts: Russell
and Norvig [186] and Luger [152] for a general treatment of artificial intelligence,
Haykin [95] on artificial neural networks, Goldberg [79] and Mitchell [163] on
genetic algorithms, Dorigo and Stutzle [57] on ant colony systems, Riesback and
Schank [183] on case based reasoning, Mirkin [162], Everitt [65], Kaufman and
Rousseeuw [120], and Jajuga [106] on clustering and classification, Tan [202] on
data mining, Turban [208] on decision support systems, Giarratano and Riely [78]
and Nikolopoulos [169] on expert systems, Cockayne and Zyda [41] and Pierre and
Glitho [178] on mobile agents.
1.4 Structure
The remainder of this report is structured as follows:
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Chapter 2 introduces the general notions behind a number of prominent Artificial
Intelligence (AI) techniques, including ‘programmed’ paradigms, as exemplified
by rule based systems, and ‘learning’ paradigms, as exemplified by artificial neural
networks. This is not intended to be a comprehensive review of AI, but a brief
overview of some of the concepts that impinge particularly on later discussion.
Chapter 3 provides a broad survey of the field of intrusion detection. The bias
is towards the application of AI techniques, but also touches on some more tradi-
tional approaches, discussing, for example, clustering, feature extraction, and pat-
tern matching. Much of the literature focusses on the detection of misuse (in the
general sense) by inspection of low level traffic. Considerably less literature con-
siders the correlation of high level alarms, although there is some recent work in
this area. However, it is observed that many of the techniques could be equally
applicable regardless of the level of the input data; that is, all of the techniques are
concerned with identifying spatial patterns within event streams. Hence, it is neces-
sary to conduct a particularly broad survey to ensure that promising techniques are
not overlooked.
Chapter 4 treats the subject from the specific perspective of event correlation. It
explores and formalises the general notions of event correlation and describes pre-
vious research solutions. There is, of necessity, some overlap with the preceding
chapter, with each in essence representing a different ‘view’ of the same topic. A
taxonomy of techniques is developed, which then provides a framework for consid-
ering specific approaches.
Chapter 5 provides an overview of current misuse localisation approaches and de-
scribes the general advantages and disadvantages of the each. This chapter focusses
more on knowledge based techniques. However, it is advantageous to combine
those approaches with the learning approaches, which are mostly covered in the
precedeing chapters.
Chapter 6 summarises the key findings of the survey and analysis of event corre-
lation. In particular, it reviews the weaknesses of rule based systems and makes





This section describes the fundamental principles of several of the prominent Arti-
ficial Intelligence (AI) paradigms that have been applied to intrusion detection. The
reader is referred to section 1.3 for references to appropriate literature for further
reading. The intention is not to provide an exhaustive treatment, but simply to intro-
duce some of the basic notions to readers who may not be familiar with AI, but who
wish to appreciate the nature of its application to the domain of intrusion detection.
2.2 Rule Based System
The terms rule based systems and expert systems are often used synonymously
within the literature. Strictly, an expert system is a rule based system, where the
rules are derived from expert knowledge, through a process referred to as knowledge
engineering. Expert systems form an approach to artificial intelligence that proposes
to leverage the experience and knowledge of experts in particular fields. In general,
a rule based system will contain a corpus of known facts about the field in which it
is intended to possess expertise. In addition it will also contain a set of rules which
represent relationships between these facts.
The main driver behind expert systems is the construction of systems with ability to
infer new knowledge from existing knowledge. The set of facts and rules alone is
really nothing more than a database. Although access to a database of information
can be sophisticated and subtle, it is not possible to obtain new knowledge. It is
only possible to present existing knowledge in knew ways. Expert systems have the
ability to exploit the knowledge within the database to infer new knowledge. In all
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cases this new knowledge is derivable from the existing corpus.
The clue to the strength of an expert system is in the term ‘derivable’. This means
that, within the context of a formal system, often predicate logic, the rules and facts
can be manipulated to adduce new rules that were not previously part of the corpus.
As mentioned, the formal system is often predicate calculus but other possibilities
exist that allow greater flexibility but perhaps less determinism. In particular it is
quite possible to use a probabilistic inferential mechanism to infer new knowledge
that in this case may be true with some attendant probability. This type of inferential
process is often called forward chaining because it moves forward from known
relationships to new relationships in an incremental way.
Another procedure is also feasible where a relationship can be hypothesized and the
inferential formal mechanism is then employed to find a path from this to a set of
known facts and relationships that support this contention. This can be thought of
as backward chaining. That is, the system is given new knowledge and is then asked
to support this by showing an chain of inference from known facts and rules to this
hypothesis; that is, in essence, proving the hypothesis.
The use of expert systems as an approach to artificial intelligence was initially very
popular because it was assumed that true understanding in a field of expertise, a dif-
ficult concept bound up with the syntax versus semantics dichotomy, would even-
tually somehow appear as the facts and rules and new knowledge became richer
and more comprehensive. However, an aspect of intelligence might conceivably be
agreed to be the ability to generalise to new knowledge from known knowledge. It
seems that humans can do this quite well but the canonical expert system approach
can not. In this case we do not mean generalisation as provable knowledge but
rather as similar knowledge, e.g. extrapolation.
An expert system has an advantage over many other approaches to AI because it is
possible to see exactly how the new knowledge is derived. That is, we have absolute
certainty about the existence and derivation of the relationships in the knowledge
corpus. This determinism is important in some applications. Aside from generalisa-
tion, a key weakness of expert systems is the time and effort required to develop, and
maintain, the knowledge containers, e.g. the rules that encapsulate the expertise.
2.3 Case Based Reasoning
AI is essentially concerned with effecting a (non-trivial) mapping from some input
space to some output space. Case Based Reasoning (CBR) exploits an assumption
that examples from similar points in the input space (however similarity might be
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measured), map to similar points in the output space [136].
A representative example, where the utility of CBR has been well explored, is the
estimation of effort required to complete a software engineering project. It is nat-
ural, when faced with such a question, to consider previous projects and their rela-
tionship to the project in question. One might then extrapolate or interpolate from
one or more previous projects of a similar nature to make an informed estimate of
likely effort on the new project. CBR is the foremost Instance Based Learning (IBL)
paradigm, which essentially formalises this notion. Yaner [222] defined CBR as the
reasoning about new problems by reusing past cases.
CBR differs from rule based models such as expert systems. A rule based model
generalises by formally inferring new knowledge without necessarily having a target
in view, known as eager generalisation, whereas CBR delays generalisation until a
new case is available, known as lazy generalisation. This makes CBR an attractive
approach for solving problems in complex domains where there exist many ways to
generalise from a specific case. Riesbeck [183] outlined two differences between
CBR and rule based reasoning. First, the knowledge base of CBR contains cases
rather than rules, and, second, partial or fuzzy matching is inherent within the CBR
paradigm.
The process of arriving at an inference using a canonical CBR approach involves
four stages, often referred to as the 4‘R’s [165].
• The system starts by Retrieving the case(s) that are most similar to the speci-
fied problem description.
• Next it Reuses the knowledge in the case(s) that were retrieved to solve the
problem.
• Then it Revises the solution.
• Finally it Retains the parts of the experience that is most likely to be useful
for future problem solving.
Mitra [165] points out that the reuse and revise stages in CBR are collectively re-
ferred to as the Case Adaptation process and that this procedure is absolutely neces-
sary because some problem definitions that occurred previously often do not match
with new problem definitions. Retrieval can be facilitated in a variety of ways, but
is based on a distance of similarity metric. Any number of cases can be drawn
from the case base to determine the solution, although this tends to be a fairly small
number, which are then combined to make the best estimate for the new case. For
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example, a simple approach where cases contain numeric data, might use the k-
Nearest Neighbour notion to select the k cases that are most similar to the new case,
and take an arithmetic mean to derive the (predicted) solution.
2.4 Articial Neural Networks
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are a biologically inspired computational
paradigm modelled on the functionality of neurons. Haykin [95] provides a stan-
dard reference to the field. The specific aspects of biological neurons that pass over
to most ANNs are the weighted aggregation of input signals which are transformed
to a single output signal (although more biological models are also being explored,
based on networks of spiking neurons). Neurons perform a many to one transfor-
mation, and the functionality of an individual neuron is limited. In particular it is in-
capable of performing a classification of non-linearly separable data [161]. Hence,
to increase the computational power networks of neurons are created by attaching
the output of one to the input of one or many others. When we consider networks
we again have an input to output transformation but now the output can be of di-
mension larger than one. Indeed, it is provable that this configuration (specifically a
three layer fully connected feedforward network) possesses universal computational
power.
Connecting artificial neurons together in this fashion can be achieved in many ways.
There are in fact several standard topologies with understood characteristics. Per-
haps the most common is the Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) which is a topology
formed from layers of neurons with no interlayer connections and only forward
pointing connections between adjacent layers. Often within this restriction MLPs
are fully connected. When connections are permitted between non adjacent layers
and indeed some connections are permitted to be missing then the topology is just
called feedforward. The computational power of either network is equal.
Operation is a compound application of a single neuron function. By this we mean
that each single neuron performs its input to output transformation passing its out-
put to any receiving neurons. They in turn perform a similar transformation and the
entire process is repeated. For a feedforward network this concludes after a finite
number of these individual neuron transformations have been executed and the en-
tire network has settled to a stable state. However, if there are feedback loops in
the topology, typically referred to as recurrent networks, then the network may have
much more complex dynamics and stabilisation may not always be achieved.
Neural networks learn through a training process that adjusts, primarily, the weights
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on input connections. There are many solutions to this training process, but they of-
ten are dependent on the topology of the network. Typically a training process will
take a set of data where it is known what the transformation should be for each
datum, and through a supervised process the ANN will be instructed on how to
reproduce this transformation. For an MLP, a common supervision mechanism is
called the backpropagation algorithm popularised by Rumelhart and McClelland
[185]. Other supervised training algorithms exist for non feedforward or recurrent
networks. These can be very complex and in many cases present extreme mathemat-
ical difficulties proving that they actually train the network. Optimisation heuristics
such as Genetic Algorithms (GA) and Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) can also
be used to evolve the topology and/or weights of an ANN provided a measure of the
fitness for purpose of a given network can be determined, e.g. based on degree of
success in learning the training transformations. ANNs can also be trained in unsu-
pervised mode, where they essentially perform some form of data clustering via a
number of different algorithms. The Kohonen network [127] is a popular example
of this class of network.
The advantages of neural approaches include the ability to learn by example and
automatically extract pertinent features of data sets, and to generalise to unseen data.
The nature of neural networks is such that training does not just learn to replicate
the transformations defined by the training data, but learns instead a more general
function to facilitate this mapping. Hence, provided that the training regime is
appropriate and the training data encapsulates sufficient knowledge of the ‘essence’
of this mapping, the neural network will be able to extract this knowledge, represent
it in the form of connection weights, and exploit it to process samples that are
similar in essence but different in value from those used in training. Disadvantages
arise when considering the reliability and non-deterministic nature of generalisation
and, of import in some domains, the inability to analyse the network for explanatory
purposes. That is, it is often difficult to know what exactly an ANN has inferred
from the training data and consequently how it will perform when presented with
unseen data.
2.5 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic Algorithms (GA) are, perhaps, the most common form of a general class
of related approaches referred to as Evolutionary Algorithms (EA). They are a bio-
logically inspired search or optimisation heuristic based on notions of evolution and
genetics. They offer an approach to the indirect solution of a problem, and as such
can be applied to complex domains about which there is insufficient knowledge
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of the problem or theoretical framework with which to reach an analytical answer.
They are often employed to relatively quickly find good quality solutions in search
spaces far too large to be considered for an exhaustive search.
Genetic Algorithms assume that a potential solution to a problem can be encoded in
some form of representation reminiscent of a chromosome. Representations based
on strings of numeric values (e.g. integer or floating-point), sequences and graphs
(e.g. path, edge and ordinal), and trees (e.g. as applied to Genetic Programming)
are common, but custom representations are possible. A function is defined (in the
general sense of providing an input–output mapping; this could be a mathemati-
cal function, a simulation, or measurement of a physical process) that provides an
assessment of the fitness for purpose of a given solution. A population of diverse
randomised solutions is generated, which will typically be of low fitness. A selec-
tion process, inspired by the Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest, selects a
number of individuals from the population to reproduce and thereby develop new
solutions (offspring).
New solutions are created by genetic operators such as crossover, mutation and in-
version, inspired by reproduction processes in natural populations. The assumption
is that two or more solutions can be combined by a fusion of various traits encoded
within the representation. This is not usually done in any prearranged way, but the
underlying premise is that the offspring of two parents of above average fitness will
tend to be also of above average fitness. This implies that the reproductive opera-
tors must combine candidate solutions in a valid and meaningful way. In addition to
recombining existing traits from the parents, exploration of the solution space is fa-
cilitated by variation operators, such as mutation, which contribute random changes
to the solutions to prevent a loss of diversity within the population. Offspring which
are fit for purpose tend to replace those that are not so fit. The basic notion is that
repeated application of the selection–reproduction–replacement cycle results in a
continual increase in the average fitness of the population, as it searches for and
exploits traits leading to good fitness scores. Genetic Algorithms are a particularly
general problem solving technique requiring three elements: a representation, re-
productive operators that can produce meaningful offspring from selected parents,
and a fitness function to assess the utility of offspring. These do not have to be
especially effective for a genetic search to function, for example, the fitness func-
tion could be approximate or noisy and the population will still learn to adapt to
the environment. Similarly, the reproductive operators do not have to create fit off-
spring from parents very often, so long as they do so occasionally. It is generally
considered a relatively easy task to get a GA to work, but a very difficult task to get
a GA to work well, due to a range of factors, including the typically large configura-
tion space of the algorithms, complexities of the search space, complex non-linear
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dynamics of the algorithm that make theoretical analysis virtually impossible. The
performance is ultimately dependent on the success of the reproductive operators
and the balance achieved between the conflicting goals of exploration of the search
space to find fit regions, and exploitation of discovered fit regions to improve ac-
curacy. This balance is effected, to varying degrees, by all of the operators (e.g.
selection, crossover, mutation, and replacement) and configuration parameters (e.g.
population size, mutation rate, and selection pressure), hence fine tuning is chal-
lenging. As with neural approaches, it is difficult to say a priori what the result of a
given GA will be on an unseen problem.
GAs are one of an increasingly large heuristic optimisation toolkit. Related tech-
niques include Ant Colony Optimisation (ACO) and Particle Swarm Optimisation
(PSO). Both are biologically inspired and population based. ACO is inspired by the
emergent behaviour resulting from low level cooperation, facilitated by pheromone
deposition, between ants in their search for efficient pathways from a nest site to
a food source. PSO is inspired by the social flocking and schooling behaviour of
various animal species, but particularly with reference to birds and fish. Both are
effective optimisation paradigms, the former particularly for combinatorial optimi-
sation, the latter for numerical optimisation. As with GAs, these techniques suffer
from high computation cost of exploring a (potentially very large) search space
through essentially non-uniform random transformations. These population based
approaches compare favourably with ‘trajectory’ based algorithms, such as Simu-
lated Annealing (SA) and Tabu Search (TS), on large and complex problems due to
their true global-local search abilities.
2.6 Mobile Agents
Mobile Agents (MA) are autonomous software entities. They can execute in a quite
general computational architecture, and exist in environments that facilitate move-
ment between such architectures. Agents contain program code, internal state and
data attributes [38]. Agents can communicate with one another, they are goal ori-
ented, and can create duplicate instances of themselves. Therefore with this func-
tionality, agents are mobile computing environments that can migrate between ex-
ecution architectures. Advantages of mobile agents include their ability to support
asynchronous task execution as client systems are able to continue performing other
tasks while the agents act on behalf of the client on a remote site. Communication
bandwidth is also reduced with this technology as computation (that is the agents) is
transferred to the data and not vice versa. It also offers improved real time abilities
as agents acting locally on a remoter site suggest a faster reaction to remote events
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than if the events have to be communicated between the remoter machine and a cen-
tral host. Agents have the ability to react dynamically to any undesirable condition
and also provide improved support for intermittently connected devices. Chess [38]
also discusses some security issues to be considered in implementing mobile based
computing. The first is the authentication of both the user that sent the agent by the
server and the server or agent execution environment. This is aimed at preventing
attacks such as spoofing. Another issue is the confirmation of the rights of the user
to execute applications on the server. Finally, it is necessary to determine the possi-
bility of the agent infecting the server and denying network users and resources of
any service.
In addition to network intrusion detection, this technology is also being imple-
mented for embedded applications such as missile guidance and satellite monitoring
Eswari [54]. Other application domains for mobile agents include data collection





This section considers the general problem of misuse detection from a variety of
perspectives. Due to the extensive literature in the area of intrusion detection, this
forms the core of the discussion. However, the techniques are considered to be
equally applicable to a range of misuse detection systems. For the most part, it
avoids specific discussion of issues related to event correlation, which is considered
in section 4. Instead, techniques applicable to low level data, e.g. TCP/IP data,
dominate both the literature and this part of the survey. A broad range of tech-
niques has been surveyed, with a particular bias towards Artificial Intelligence (AI)
approaches, and some overlap between this chapter and chapter 4 is unavoidable.
However, the perspective is different. In addition to AI techniques, a number of re-
lated issues are also discussed, such as clustering, pattern matching and profiling, as
they crop up frequently in the literature. In general, however, traditional approaches
have not been surveyed to any great degree.
This chapter organises the literature according to the technique involved. However,
some techniques do not easily fit within these categories, whilst others compound
two or more approaches. In such cases, the techniques have either been placed under
the category of the dominant approach, or where they make most sense to the dis-
cussion. On occasion this has placed seemingly unrelated techniques together due
to some shared underlying notion. The section on data mining is noteworthy prin-
cipally because it does not reflect a specific technique, but rather, the general con-
cept of (typically) extracting information from large data sets using unsupervised
learning methods. Some of the approaches within this section could, therefore, be
relocated to specific categories based on the techniques used, whilst, occasionally,
approaches that could reasonably be referred to as data mining, appear elsewhere.
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This is deliberate, and is again based on the nature of the discussion. The section
on hybrid approaches is similar, in that one could treat them under the categories
of their constituent technologies, however, in some cases, the arguments are about
specific approaches, whilst in others they are about combining approaches to lever-
age advantages of multiple paradigms. Rather than replicate the treatment of the
techniques under each of the applicable categories, they are generally considered
only once, wherever deemed most appropriate.
It is evident from the literature, and hence reflected in this survey, that a number
of key concepts are common across a range of work. For example, the opposing
notions of anomaly detection and misuse detection, with the former being able to
generalise to some degree to unknown attacks but suffering from a high rate of false
alarms, and the latter generating few false alarms but not being able to generalise.
Other common factors include the idea of profiling, i.e. constructing representations
of behaviour, whether at user, application, or system level, and an assumption of
consistency of profiles over time; the notion of feature extraction, which is of import
with a wide range of techniques; and the dominance of rule based approaches for
misuse detection and non-rule based approaches for anomaly detection.
3.2 Overview of Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring and analysing events that occur in
a computer or networked computer system. Although the term ‘intrusion’ has quite
specific connotations, intrusion detection is often used in the literature in a gen-
eral sense, to refer to analysis performed to obtain indications of fraud, misuse or
unauthorised access, e.g. Bace and Mell [13]. Intrusion detection systems employ
techniques for modelling and recognising intrusive behaviours in a system, which
come in different variants. Bolton and Hand [23], for example, identify the follow-
ing fraud variants:
• Frauds aimed at the service provider. For example the resale of stolen call
time.
• Frauds enabled by the service provider. For example, interfering with tele-
phone banking instructions.
Typically, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) first operated at host level. In this con-
text the IDS monitor was concerned with single host machines and made extensive
use of the host operating system. However the trend has shifted to networked sys-
tems with the IDS monitoring any number of systems on a network by analysing the
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audit trails and the network traffic [121, 122]. Kim and Bently [121, 122] consider
requirements for network based IDSs to include: robustness, extendibility, scalabil-
ity, adaptability, configurability and efficiency. Kachirski and Guba [116] observe
that traditional IDSs for fixed networks can be considered as either network based
or host based. A network based IDS functions by probing the network and examin-
ing packets, listening either actively or passively to the network traffic. Conversely,
a host based IDS functions by detecting actions in each host in a network, and nor-
mally operates by accessing log files or monitoring real time system usage, such as
failed access attempts or attempted modifications to system files.
Two main categories of intrusion detection (ID) are misuse detection and anomaly
detection [138]:
• Anomaly detection (AD) is used to identify patterns of behaviour that differ
from learnt patterns of normal behaviour, and hence might be representative
of malicious activity.
• Misuse detection (MD) is used to identify the occurrence of specific patterns
of behaviour that are known to represent malicious activity.
Some intrusion detection systems offer both capabilities, typically through hybridi-
sation. The limitation of anomaly detection is that it could generate a high rate
of false positives Dokas et al. [56], i.e. when the system is not sufficiently aware
of all of the possible legitimate patterns of behaviour and assumes that a previous
unseen pattern constitutes an attack. Another possibility is the presence of an un-
known intrusion in the sample data on which the system learnt the expected normal
behaviour. Conversely, misuse detection has the limitation of being unable to gen-
eralise from known attacks to unknown attacks, and is therefore prone to generating
false negatives.
Verwoerd and Hunt [211] recognise some common building blocks for an intrusion
or misuse detection system:
• Sensor probe that gathers data from the system under inspection
• Monitor that receives events from a number of sensors and forwards suspi-
cious content to a ‘resolver’
• Resolver that determines a suitable response to suspicious content
• Controller that provides administrative functions
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Verwoerd and Hunt also describe a range of modelling techniques for both anomaly
detection and misuse detection. For the former, they consider techniques such as ar-
tificial immune systems, artificial neural networks, protocol verification, statistical
modelling methods and clustering analysis. For the latter, they consider techniques
such as expression matching, genetic algorithms, state transition analysis, and the
use of dedicated languages (e.g. such as proposed by Paxson [176] and Ranum et
al. [182]). It is clear from the literature that a diversity of both traditional and AI
based techniques can be applied to both anomaly and misuse detection. However,
when it comes to event correlation, it is equally clear that rule based approaches are
not only well established1 but dominate the field. The limitations of rule based ap-
proaches centre around two key points: the difficulty of developing and maintaining
the rule base, and a lack of generalisation ability. Thus, a range of AI techniques,
such as artificial neural networks, have been combined with rule based systems in
order to alleviate these difficulties. Such hybridisation remains an active area of
research.
The following sections consider some of the diverse approaches from the litera-
ture, starting with canonical rule based systems, before moving on to consider ap-
proaches based on more contemporary AI.
3.3 Rule Based Systems
Much of the literature concerning rule based and expert systems focusses, specifi-
cally, on event correlation, and is therefore treated in section 4. Further, many rule
based systems have been hybridised with a range of other techniques. Examples
are mentioned below, but are treated in more detail in section 3.12. In this section,
several examples of conventional rule based systems are provided.
Lindqvist and Porras [146] describe an expert system toolset referred to as the
Production-Based Expert System Toolset (P-BEST). This was applied to the de-
velopment of a generic signature analysis engine for computer and network misuse
detection. Rule sets where described for detecting subversion methods (e.g. SYN
flooding and buffer overruns), to which systems are often vulnerable. The approach
consists of a rule translator, a runtime library, and a set of garbage collection rou-
tines. The results from the evaluations performed, together with some examples,
indicate that expert systems of this type are a good choice for handling real time
misuse detection. It was observed that the ease of implementation of this system
1For example, systems such as Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System (MIDAS) [188]
and Next Generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES) [8], both of which are based on
the Production Based Expert System Toolset (P-BEST) [146].
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and its close integration with the C programming language makes it easy to use and
flexible. P-BEST was found to be adequately fast for real time detection of most
widely used attack methods.
Lindqvist and Porras [147] later describe a real time forward reasoning expert sys-
tem, eXpert-BSM, that is able to analyse Sun Solaris audit trails. The system has
a large knowledge base, comprised of years of intrusion detection research, and is
thus able to detect a wide range of specific and general types of misuse. It is host
based and operates as a security daemon within the host, using few CPU cycles and
little memory. Different sets of eXpert-BSM rules may be deployed throughout a
network, and their alarms managed, correlated, and used by local security services.
The system is purported to be able to provide detailed reports and recommendations
to system administrators, whilst offering a low rate of false alarms.
Vaarandi [209] presents a platform independent open source tool for rule based
event correlation called the Simple Event Correlator (SEC). This tool is able to
deal with the complexity, size and cost issues typical of event correlators. SEC
configuration is stored in text files and each configuration contains one or more
rules. Sets of rules from different files are applied logically and in parallel. SEC
receives input events from pipes, files, and standard input, and can therefore be
utilised by any application that is able to write its output events to a file stream.
It produces output events by executing shell commands specified by the user. Of
particular interest, is the range of correlation rule types that the system supports. As
specified in [209], these include inter alia
• Rules that involve a simple match with an input event and the execution of
some action.
• Matching an input event, executing a list of actions and applying some exter-
nal script or program if certain exit values are returned.
• Matching input events, with execution of an action list, whilst ignoring sub-
sequent matching events for a certain time period.
• Matching input events, executing an action list, then ignoring subsequent
matching events until some other input event arrives, at which time another
action list is executed.
• Matching an input event and waiting for a certain time period for another
input event to arrive, and then executing an action if it arrives on time.
• Counting matching input events over a certain number of seconds and, if
some threshold is exceeded, executing an action list and ignoring subsequent
matching events during the remaining time span.
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Other rule types exist, and this highlights the need for a rich language for rule
specification, to enable the varied relationships between events to be satisfactorily
correlated.
Rule based systems have been hybridised with a variety of techniques. Hanemann
et al. [86] describe a combination of a rule based reasoning engine with a case based
reasoning engine. Yang et al. [223] propose the use of cluster analysis and expert
systems. Marin et al. [155] present a hybrid technique that applies expert rules for
the reduction of the dimensionality of the data, followed by initial clustering, and
subsequent refinement of the cluster locations using a competitive network, Learn-
ing Vector Quantisation (LVQ). Bridges and Vaughn [24] present a hybrid of fuzzy
data mining and expert system techniques. Guerer et al. [84] present an approach
that utilises both neural networks and case based reasoning techniques for handling
fault management in distributed and heterogeneous information networks, with an
expert system to filter network alarms. See section 3.12 for further discussion of
hybrid systems.
3.4 Case Based Reasoning
Case based reasoning (CBR) refers to reasoning about new problems based on past
known cases [222]. Somewhat surprisingly, CBR has not been found to be a com-
mon approach despite its attraction in prediction, based predominantly on pattern
matching. This may be due to the non-trivialities of the representation of complex
event patterns in a form amenable to CBR. There are, however, some examples,
such as Koford-Peterson and Aamodt [126], who describe an approach for identi-
fying and specifying user situations in a context aware mobile environment. This
approach uses CBR as the main reasoning engine of the system, and incorporates
it within a multi agent system for providing the user with personalised and context
sensitive information. The reasoning mechanism of the approach is adaptive and
thus it is relatively easy to introduce new services.
Canonical CBR systems have been extended to handle sequences of concurrent
events from multiple sources. Ceaseless CBR [157] is essentially a modification
of the retrieval and reuse stages of traditional CBR. Cases that are retrieved are se-
quences of sequences of alerts, which the system is able to sub-divide into sections
as the alerts are received. Reuse involves the exploration of the grouping of the
cases that best describes the most recent occurring events.
Case based reasoning approaches have also been hybridised and applied to intrusion
detection in various studies. Some of these include studies by Hanemann [86], who
20
proposed a hybrid approach that combined a rule based reasoning engine and a case
base reasoning engine. See section 3.12 for further discussion of hybrid systems.
3.5 Pattern Matching
Pattern matching algorithms are a critical element in many signature based ap-
proaches. The term refers to the process of searching for certain patterns, expressed
as sequences or tree structures within a body of data. It is most often employed to
identify attack signatures in network packets [105]. Weaknesses of the approach
include the computational load, as the number of comparisons required to ascertain
the presence of a range of signatures within a large sample of traffic can be large,
and the use of fixed signatures, which limits detection to known cases [105]. Tech-
niques range from general purpose string matching functions to more specialised
matching engines, customised for instruction detection.
Kumar and Spafford [132] describe a generic model of matching based on Coloured
Petri Nets (CPN), a form of Petri net where the arcs contain data and can be used
to describe a variety of different systems. In their approach, pattern matching is
used to detect system attacks, with the knowledge concerning the nature of attacks
represented as specialised graphs. The graphs are an adaptation of CPNs, with
vertices representing the system states and signature contexts represented by the
guards. The graphs thus represent those state transitions that lead to a detectable
intrusion state. Their system separates the various concerns of a generic misuse
detector into components
• The information layer, encapsulating the audit trails.
• The signature layer, providing the internal representation of signatures.
• The matching engine.
Wespi et al. [217] present an approach to build tables of variable length patterns
based on Teiresias, which was originally developed for the discovery of patterns in
biological sequences. This study applied the approach to the detection of attacks
against UNIX processes, achieved by observing behavioural deviations in the pro-
cesses. The system uses a table of patterns to model the normal behaviour of such
processes, based on audit events, and offers both off-line and real time detection.
Kuri et al. [133] present a pattern matching approach based on insertion distance.
This model handles an attack as a sequence of letters, and the algorithm detects the
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text portions everywhere the events of the attack appear, in order, within a window
of k other events. This enables the algorithm to quickly filter out large portions
of the text and leave the remaining parts to be examined by another algorithm. The
approach was evaluated using audit trails and an attack database, and was successful
in addressing some of the problems of speed and complexity of intrusion detection
algorithms.
Markatos et al. [156] describe a string matching algorithm designed specifically
according to the features of network intrusion detection string matching. This ap-
proach, called ExB, provides exclusion based multiple string matching. The central
notion is the examination of the contents of each packet received, to confirm if it
contains all fixed sized bit strings of the signature string while not taking into con-
sideration whether the bit strings appear in sequence. It was evaluated against the
set of algorithms being implemented in SNORT using trace driven execution with
real packet traces. Reported advantages include efficient and easy implementation,
and considerable improvement in system performance, particularly with increasing
packet size, having good scalability to increasing rule sets.
Clark and Schimmel [40] describe a module generator making use of non-
deterministic finite automata to create efficient circuits for matching patterns, as
specified in a standard rule language. The system, consisting of a rule parse and
circuit generator2 is able to translate a SNORT rule file into a circuit description,
which is then used to match the content strings. The system also offers approximate
matching.
Anagnostakis et al. [7] describe a string matching algorithm, E2xB, for increasing
the efficiency and capacity of network intrusion detection systems. The approach is
based on confirming the presence of every character of the input string in the space
searched. E2xB was implemented in SNORT and performance compared against
the alternative solutions of Fisk and Varghese [67]. Fisk and Varghese based their
work on a set-wise Boyer Moore-Hospool algorithm, an adaptation of the Boyer-
Moore algorithm, which is shown to be faster for matching less than 100 patterns.
For typical traffic patterns, E2xB gave increase performance and improvement de-
tection capability.
Norton [170] presents an algorithm for intrusion detection based on an optimised
version of the Aho-Corasick algorithm [5]. The latter was designed to be able to
locate all occurrences of any of a finite number of keywords in a string based on
a finite state pattern matching machine. The version described by Norton is an
enhancement to the implementation presented in SNORT [31], employing an opti-
mised vector implementation of the Aho-Corasick state table, with improvements
2Specifying FPGA circuit components and their connections.
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in algorithm performance and on large pattern groups. A SNORT based intrusion
detection performance test, and several dictionary tests, indicated significant im-
provements in pattern matching capacity, whilst being less memory intensive.
Abbes et al. [2] introduced an ‘on-the-fly’ multi-pattern IDS for real time analysis
of network traffic. The central notion is to process packets as they are received and
strip out and retain only those aspects that are required for the pattern matching
function. The approach, employed as an extension of SNORT, was said to be ro-
bust to denial of service and port scanning attacks, and to address the complicated
techniques that are employed to evade an IDS.
Song and Lockwood [193, 194] present a novel packet classification architecture
called BV-TCAM for a FPGA based network intrusion detection system. This
architecture combines the Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM) (used
for packet classification) and the Bit Vector (BV) algorithm to compress the data
representations and enhance throughput. The BV algorithm performs the function
of lookup of source and destination ports, whilst the TCAM performs the role of
lookup of the other header fields. It is able to report multiple matches at fast network
link rates and sustain traffic throughput. Song and Lockwood [194] also introduced
a data structure known as an Extended Bloom Filter (EBF) [22] and a hardware
based algorithm for multi-pattern signature matching. A further technique, to sup-
port long signature matching, was also introduced, enabling the maintenance of a
limited number of supported signature lengths for the EBFs. It was demonstrated
that fast exact matching for thousands of signatures was achievable at a reason-
able hardware cost. The algorithm was integrated into a hardware based network
intrusion detection system and demonstrated to be highlight efficient in terms of
throughput and memory utilisation, achieving fast exact matching for thousands of
signatures.
Antonatos et al. [10] describe an algorithm for pattern matching, referred to as Pi-
ranha, that is based on the notion that if the rarest substring of a pattern is not
present, then the whole pattern cannot match. The algorithm is implemented within
SNORT customised for intrusion detection and is said to offer significant improve-
ments in both processing and memory utilisation, when compared with existing ap-
proaches, such as the Wu-Manber [220] multi-pattern matching algorithm (MWM)
and domain specific exclusion based string matching algorithm (E2xB) [7].
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3.6 Clustering and Feature Extraction
Clustering is primarily used in the detection of patterns in network traffic. Port-
noy et al. [181] use single linkage hierarchical clustering to separate anomalous
and normal traffic patterns from the KDD-Cup99 data set. This method is able to
automatically detect both new and known intrusions. Their algorithm follows the
typical agglomerative approach; i.e. each new instance retrieved from the the nor-
malised data set is compared with the existing clusters and, following the single
linkage rule (i.e., based on the distance between the instance and the nearest of the
current members of the cluster) is added to the nearest cluster, provided that it is
within a predefined cluster width. If it falls outside of that width, it becomes the
first member of a new cluster. Whilst the need to specify a priori the number of
clusters, it does require an appropriate value for the cluster width to be determined.
The authors found a detection rate of approximately 50% and false alarm rate of
below 1%.
Leung and Leckie [141] present a grid based clustering approach for unsupervised
anomaly detection. Taking unlabelled data as input, the technique attempts to find
intrusions that are embedded in the data, based on two assumptions from Portnoy et
al. [181] and Javitz and Vadles [111]. The former observe that the majority of net-
work connections represent normal behaviour, whilst the latter contend that traffic
due to an attack is statistically different from normal traffic. It is this latter property
that is of particular import to traditional clustering and classification techniques.
The benefit of such a system is its ability to detect previously unknown attacks. The
authors also claim that unsupervised learning with unlabelled data improved the
efficiency of the detection system as it removes the requirement for a database of
signatures. Evaluation on actual network data suggests that results were consistent
with similar studies by Oldmeadow et al. [174] and Eskin et al. [64]. However the
underlying assumptions do lead to limitations. The authors provide the example of
detecting a bandwidth denial of service (DoS) attack, where there are as many in-
stances of intrusion as of non-intrusive behaviour. The same underlying principles
hold for many techniques of this nature, and they can suffer the general drawback
of anomaly detection, that of being prone to issuing false positives.
Leon et al. [140] tackled intrusion detection with an approach based on Unsuper-
vised Niche Clustering (UNC). They described UNC as a genetic niching technique
for clustering that is robust to the effects of noise and can automatically determine
the number of clusters in a system. Niching is a diversity mechanism that is capable
of maintaining multiple optima in genetic and other population based search tech-
niques [187]. Leon et al. combined UNC with fuzzy set theory and a membership
function associated with each of the evolved clusters.
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Hu and Zhan [103] also consider a hierarchical approach, but go on to develop a
technique for optimising the cluster allocation by identifying anomaly clusters with
degrees of membership, and optimising the system to maximise the detection rate
and minimise the false alarm rate. The authors validate their work on the DARPA
data set, and find detection rates of over 70% for known attacks and 50% for un-
known attacks.
Clustering also forms a part of a number of hybrid approaches to intrusion detection.
For example, Yang et al. [223] proposed a hybrid of cluster analysis and expert sys-
tems, Marin et al. [155] present a hybrid technique that applies expert rules for the
reduction of the dimensionality of the data, followed by initial clustering, and sub-
sequent refinement of the cluster locations using a competitive network, Learning
Vector Quantisation (LVQ). Refer to section 3.12 for more detailed consideration
of hybrid approaches.
3.7 Articial Neural Networks
Neural networks have been applied in a variety of intrusion detection contexts; on
their own merits for the detection of attacks, to perform some preprocessing of input
data, and as part of hybrid approaches. Their strength lies in their ability to learn
by example, automatically extract pertinent features from data sets, and, critically,
to generalise from known cases to the unknown.
Ghosh and Schwartzbard [76] employed a neural network to learn the profile of
normal system behaviour. This was then applied to both anomaly and misuse detec-
tion. Their approach is process based and capable of generalising from previously
observed attacks to novel attacks. An adaptive neural approach to anomaly detec-
tion was presented by Cannady [29] that was able to learn new attacks without the
need for complete retraining. It also offered the ability to autonomously improve
on previous analysis.
Jing Xin et al. [113], motivated by the need to reduce the rate of false positives,
applied a neural network based classifier, within a modular system. They suggest a
need for different modules that a neural network based intrusion detection systems
should include:
• packet monitor for capturing network packets for input to the detection system
• feature extraction to transform the network stream into a feature vector for
classification
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• neural network based classifier to infer from the feature vector the absence or
presence of an intrusion
• mechanism for providing feedback to the user
• database of intrusion samples for training the neural network
• event database for recording the correlated information on occurrence of an
intrusion
Their approach adopted a Back Propagation (BP) classifier and, although it reduced
the rate of false positives against traditional intrusion detection systems, they iden-
tified a limitation in the generalisation ability of the classifier.
Lei and Ghorbani [139] describe a technique for detecting network intrusions based
on the Standard Competitive Learning Network (SCLN). This is essentially a sin-
gle layer network, with output neurons fully connected to the input neurons. Out-
put neurons compete to activate, with winning neurons being reinforced. There is,
therefore, some similarity with the notions of the Self Organising Map SOM. The
performance of the approach, applied to the KDD-Cup99 data set showed similar
detection rates for both the SCLN and a SOM, however the SCLN is said to require
only one fourth of the computational effort of the SOM.
Chen et al. [37] note that it is computationally expensive to examine all of the fea-
tures in a data set to detect misuse patterns and further observe that some of the data
is redundant. This led them to propose a mechanism based on an enhanced Flexible
Neural Tree (FNT), to identify the important input features for building detection
systems that were effective and computationally efficient. An evolutionary algo-
rithmwas used in developing the FNT structure, whilst particle swarm optimisation
was used to optimise the parameters. Exploration of the approach suggested that
a reduction in the feature space is possible, and that this does lead to performance
improvements.
Depren et al. [55] introduced an architecture combining an anomaly detection mod-
ule and a misuse detection module with a decision support system that combines the
results from the individual detection mechanisms. Anomaly detection uses a SOM
to model normal behaviour. The SOM essentially transforms high dimensional in-
put data to a low dimensional (often two dimensional) output space, with different
output neurons representing the classifications of the input data [39]. Classifica-
tion is based on similarity, i.e., grouping together entities that are geometrically
close. This can also be used as a means to visualise complex data sets. Hoglund
and Hatonen [101], for example, present a system that provides automated anomaly
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detection as well as visualisation of user behaviour. This study focussed in partic-
ular on the visualisation aspect, which it achieved using a a two dimensional Self
Organising Map (SOM). Returning to Depren et al., their misuse detection module
employed the J.48 decision tree algorithm to classify various types of attacks. A
rule based decision support system then interprets the results from both modules.
Performance evaluation based on application to the KDD-Cup99 data set suggests
that the combination is more effective than either approach used in isolation.
Eskin et al. [64] presented an algorithm for anomaly detection using feature map-
ping. Two feature maps were created, one for network connections and one for
call traces. A number of algorithms were applied to the feature maps with a view
to identifying sparse regions of the map, the contention being that these are rep-
resentative of anomalies. Evaluation on the KDD-Cup99 data set showed that the
approach was successful in detecting intrusions from unlabelled data.
Neural networks have been widely used as components in hybrid systems. Pan et
al. [175] combine neural networks with the C4.5 decision tree algorithm. Zhang
et al. [230] combine statistical preprocessing and neural network classification to
construct a hierarchical intrusion detection system. Taniguchi et al. [204] combine
feedforward neural networks based on supervised learning, with Gaussian mixture
models and Bayesian networks. Endler [60] examined statistical likelihood analysis
and neural networks, where the former was used for anomaly detection and the latter
for misuse detection. See section 3.12 for further information on hybrid approaches.
3.8 Genetic Algorithms
A Genetic Algorithm (GA), a class of evolutionary algorithm, is a population based
search algorithm, which can be applied to a wide range of numeric and combinato-
rial search and optimisation scenarios. It is often used to evolve optimal rules for
use within other detection mechanisms, to automate the process of knowledge gen-
eration. Sinclair et al. [191] suggested that GAs can be used to evolve simple rules
for network traffic, which can then be sorted in a rule base and used to filter net-
work traffic. Li [144] also use GAs to evolve if...then rules to differentiate between
normal and anomalous connections, based on both temporal and spatial information
related to network connections. Pillai et al. [179] also adopt a GA to generate rules
for specific connections based on TCP/IP fields.
Balajinath and Raghavan [14] present a genetic algorithm based intrusion detection
(GBID) system, which uses genetic algorithms to learn a network user’s behaviour,
with regard to commands issued. Within a given sample of commands, three mea-
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sures are applied: the ratio of commands predicted correctly to the length of the
sample, the distribution of commands, and the number of commands occurring that
are not in the user’s past command history. These measures of current behaviour are
compared with known non-intrusive behaviours to identify anomalous behaviour
patterns. Features of this approach are said to include a low false alarm rate and
the ability to detect new attacks in real time. In their study, a detection accuracy of
96.8% was reported.
Gonzalez et al. [80] use an evolutionary approach to generate fuzzy signatures for
detecting intrusions, referred to as Evolving Fuzzy Rules (EFR). This was tested
on a number of different data sets and is said to offer advantages such as a clear
separation between anomalies and normal network activities, attributed to the fuzzy
representation of the rules. Abadeh et al. [1] also propose an evolutionary fuzzy
rule learning algorithm, in this case employing particle swarm optimisation (PSO),
another population based search heuristic, to generate a set of rules which then form
the basis of an IDS. The proposed evolutionary algorithm is based on the Michigan
approach [12].
3.9 Articial Immune Systems
In the context of intrusion detection, artificial immune systems, applying mecha-
nisms inspired by natural immune systems, are typically applied to identify anoma-
lous patterns (‘non-self’), based on an understanding of normal behaviour (‘self’).
Forrest et al. [68] present an approach, known as negative selection, based on
the mechanism used by the immune system to train T-cells to recognise antigens
and prevent them from recognising the body’s own cells (the self or normal cells).
This essentially discards detectors that match any self element. Hofmeyr and For-
rest [100] successfully applied a variation of this algorithm for anomaly detection.
Dasgupta and Attoch-Okine [48] present a study on immune system approaches to
intrusion detection. They draw comparisons between the idiotypic approach, based
on the reaction of antibodies to each other as well as the antigen, and the negative
selection based approach, or self/non-self model. They surveyed the application
of both techniques to anomaly detection, pattern recognition and fault diagnosis.
Dasgupta [45, 46] later considered the application of immunological principles to
the design of multi-agent intrusion detection systems, where immunity based agents
roam around the system (e.g. nodes or routers), monitor the situation in the network
and search for changes such as malfunctions, abnormalities, misuse, intrusions, etc.
Agent activities are coordinated in a hierarchical manner, with agents being able
to mutually detect the abilities of other agents. The agents are able to learn and
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adapt to their environment and detect both known and unknown intrusions and the
techniques work simultaneously on different levels (e.g., packet, process, system
and user), and can detect misuse from within the system as well as outside attacks.
Dasgupta and Gonzalez [47] applied the negative selection mechanism for the de-
tection of patterns that are alien to a network. They presented approaches based on
both positive characterisation (PC) and negative characterisation (NC). For the for-
mer, positive samples from the training data were used to build a categorisation of
self space. The measure of abnormality of an element was measured by the distance
from the element to the nearest neighbour in the self set. It was observed that mem-
ory requirements can be a drawback when it is necessary to store all the samples
that constitute a normal profile, which calls into question the feasibility when ap-
plied to real volumes of network traffic, hence the motivation for the NC approach,
which uses a real valued representation to characterise the self/non-self space and a
genetic algorithm to evolve the set of detectors.
Hofmeyr and Forrest [99] also describe a distributed intrusion detection system,
operating at the TCP/IP level. They adopted the self/non-self approach in their ar-
chitecture, and defined self as a set of normal pair-wise connections and non-self as
connections not normally observed on the network. The system contains immature,
mature and memory detectors. The former are randomly generated and undergo a
negative selection process to remove those detectors that bind to self. The mature
and memory detectors are responsible for detecting anomalous activity. A success-
ful matching of a non-self by a mature detector, causes it to become a memory
detector, which has a longer lifespan. Various other immune system concepts were
also integrated within their architecture. The system was reported to give favourable
results when evaluated on a 50 machine subnet.
Hou et al. [102] adapted the work of Hofmeyr and Forrest [99] for monitoring
TCP/IP traffic on a simulated broadcast local area network. They employed con-
straint based detectors, which they argue are easier to understand compared with
those based on binary strings, and facilitate analysis of the traffic, during an intru-
sion, by the system security officer. By varying parameters of the technique Hou et
al. managed to improve the detection rate.
Kim and Bentley [121] investigated the role of negative selection in the performance
of artificial immune systems for intrusion detection. By applying this mechanism to
real network data, they determine that negative selection is infeasible as an approach
to generating detectors, as the computation time prevents sufficient detectors from
being found. They conclude that negative selection is best applied to filter invalid
detectors rather than as a mechanism for generating competent detectors.
Kim and Bentley [122] later describe a dynamic selection algorithm referred to
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as Dynamic Clonal Selection, dynamicCS. Adopting the technique described by
Hofmeyr and Forrest [99], a particular feature of this technique is its ability to adapt
to continuously changing environments, and thereby learn the patterns of self and
predict new patterns of non-self. Their study shows that dynamicCS is effective at
incremental learning on converged data and can adapt to new attack patterns as they
arise.
Balthrop et al. [15] described an artificial immune system framework known as
LISYS, specialised for network intrusion detection. It learns to detect abnormal
packets by observing normal traffic. By using only a partial sample of network
traffic, it is able to generalise from its observations to correctly classify abnormal
behaviour patterns. This again uses negative selection to retain only those detectors
that fail to match normal traffic patterns.
Hall and Frincke [85] proposed an architecture known as Immune System Net-
work Intrusion Detection System (ISNIDS), for intrusion detection in a broad based
multi-enterprise misuse management system. This comprised two related systems
– a primary and a secondary IDS, able to communicate across the network. The
primary IDS is centralised and creates the detectors, whilst the secondary IDS is
distributed and responsible for data gathering, reduction, detection and response,
and forwarding successful detections to the primary IDS. A rule based detection
scheme was built to facilitate the evaluation process, and results indicated that the
immune system approach was better at detecting anomalous patterns.
The development of systems inspired by immune system principles remains an ac-
tive area of research. Other work includes Gu et al. [83], who employed an immune
system for the detection of Internet viruses and hackers attempting to penetrate the
system, and De Castro and Timmis [50], who describe an immune system approach
for pattern recognition and detection, where the knowledge is distributed among the
components of a population based system.
3.10 Agent Based Approaches
Agent based approaches, and Mobile Agents (MA) in particular, are of interest for
the detection of attacks within a distributed environment. They have been applied by
numerous authors, for example, Zhicai et al. [229], Helmer et al. [96] and Kachirski
and Guba [116]. However, some authors point to disadvantages or challenges with
the approach. For example, Jansen et al. [110] consider problems related to speed,
volume of the code required to implement an MA, deployment, limited method-
ologies and tools. They can also present threats to a network when they are often
30
required to execute with administrative privileges to perform autonomous diagnoses
and responses. Jansen et al. have also highlighted a number of advantages, includ-
ing mobility, overcoming network latency, robustness and fault tolerance. Agent
approaches have been applied for both anomaly and misuse detection in a range of
studies.
In the model developed by Helmer et al. [96] the mobile agents travel between the
monitored systems in a network and obtain information from data clearing agents.
This information is then organised, correlated, then reported to a user interface and
database through mediators. Kim et al. [123] observe that different security rules
may be needed in different security systems within distributed networks, and the
propagation of these rules is important. They made use of mobile agents to facilitate
this propagation in large-scale networks, and report that it is able to spread the rules
rapidly. Kachirski and Guba [116] also proposed a distributed IDS based on mobile
agent technology and applied this to ad hoc wireless networks. Their approach
merged audit data from multiple network sensors and analysed the entire network
for actions that suggest the occurrence of intrusions.
Zhicai et al. [229] proposed a hierarchical model of multi-level intrusion detection.
They observe that intrusive behaviours are becoming more complex and hence de-
tection is becoming increasingly more difficult. They explored the use of intelligent
mobile agents to develop a distribution IDS. The model adopted a multi-level ap-
proach, employing node, subnet and network level detectors. The detectors are au-
tonomous yet can share information to work together to detect complex intrusions.
The authors found this model to be capable of effectively identifying complicated
attacks, whilst having the additional advantages of reducing the the communication
load and adaptation to changing environments. Deeter et al. [53] also describe a
system for efficient and flexible distribution of analysis and monitoring tasks. Their
approach, referred to as APHIDS (A Mobile Agent Based Programmable Hybrid
Intrusion Detection System), defines a high level scripting language which is appli-
cation specific, to identify the interaction between monitoring and analysis agents.
The motivations in this case refer to bandwidth and processing scalability.
Ahmed et al. [4] used mobile agents to monitor the usage of various system re-
sources to detect deviations from normal usage. Their approach, known as Intrusion
Detection System Using Distributed Agents (IDSUDA), was claimed to extend the
capabilities of conventional intrusion detection systems. The agents monitor net-
work traffic behaviour at multiple levels (e.g. packet, process, system and user) to
identify anomalous patterns.
Somewhat related to agent based systems are models based on ant colony systems.
Tsang and Kwong [207] presented a multi-agent IDS framework for decentralised
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intrusion prevention and detection. The learning is based on an ant colony cluster-
ing model, ACCM, and four unsupervised feature extraction algorithms are applied
to address the problem of dimensionality. The feature extraction algorithms were
evaluated on their effectiveness to enhance the clustering solution, by application to
the KDD-Cup99 data set. Results suggest that ACCM combined with one of the fea-
ture extraction algorithms enables effective detection of both known and unknown
attacks with a high detection rate, whilst screening normal traffic with a low false
positive rate. Banerjee et al. [16] describe an adaptive ant colony based method for
intrusion detection that is also able to monitor intruder trails. It was designed for
securing sensor networks, and is referred to as Intrusion Detection based on Emo-
tional Ants for Sensors (IDEAS). Soroush et al. [195] proposed an ant colony based
data miner for intrusion detection, that is able to extract a set of classification rules
from network data to distinguish between normal and anomalous behaviours.
3.11 Data Mining
Data mining is not a specific paradigm, but refers instead to the processing of a
(typically large) data set with a view to summarising the data into a more usable
form and/or gaining insights concerning patterns in the data that are statistically re-
liable [58]. Data mining comprises a variety of tools, including those drawn from
statistics, machine learning and natural computing. Such approaches, could, there-
fore, be be distributed amongst those sections concerned with their component tech-
nologies, however, they approach the problem of intrusion detection in the same sort
of way – by mining the data (typically using unsupervised learning) to extract perti-
nent relationships. A number of examples from the literature are briefly presented.
Lavrac and Dzeroski [135] and Ko [125] employ Inductive Logic Programming
(ILP) to develop rules for detecting attacks from analysing specifications. Lee and
Stolfo [137] used data mining techniques to discover models that describe sys-
tem and user behaviours based on network logs. Pertinent system features were
also used for creating classifiers that can recognise anomalies and known intru-
sions. Lane and Brodley [134] also considered the problem of characterising the
behaviours of an individual system and its users, to facilitate anomaly detection.
However, their approach was based on a form of Instance Based Learning (IBL). In
order to apply IBL, they defined a transformation from a sequence of observations
to a metric space, then the features of valid user behaviour and a domain heuristic
were used to select classification boundaries. Their empirical evaluation established
that the system is able to differentiate between the profiled users and other users,
provided that sufficient information has been encoded by the system features. War-
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render et al. [215] explored the ability of different modelling methods to accurately
represent normal behaviour, and hence identify intrusions, by examining data sets
comprising calls to the operating system kernel. Their work favoured a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM).
Neri [168] examined distributed genetic algorithms and a heuristics based algo-
rithm for modelling network traffic. The impact of a compressed representation for
network packet data was considered. Neri suggests that this compression of fea-
tures might result in an abstract representation that could allow better recognition
performance or simplify modelling. Yairi et al. [221] employ clustering to automat-
ically construct a system behaviour model in the form of a set of rules. Ye [224]
used a data mining algorithm (Clustering and Classification Algorithm – Supervised
(CCA-S) for learning the signature patterns of normal and intrusive activities, and
then for classification of unseen data.
Barbara et al. [17, 18] applied the Audit Data Analysis and Mining (ADAM) as
a testbed for studying the application of data mining approaches to intrusion de-
tection. ADAM is an anomaly detection system composed of three modules: a
pre-processing engine, which scans TCP/IP traffic and extracts information from
the header of each connection; a mining engine that, in training mode, is capable
of creating profiles for normal user and system behaviour and generating associa-
tion rules, and, in detection mode, mining actual traffic for unanticipated associate
rules; and a classification engine that determines whether unanticipated rules are
different from the profile and hence to be considered as abnormal behaviour. Their
later work [18] applies psuedo-Bayes estimators to enhance the system’s ability to
detect unknown attacks whilst reducing false positives.
Dokas et al. [56] present an approach based on building rare class prediction models
for identifying known intrusions and their variations, together with anomaly detec-
tion schemes for detecting new attacks. Ertoˆz et al. [62] introduce the Minnesota
Intrusion Detection System (MINDS), which is able to automatically detect attacks
using a set of data mining techniques. Brugger [27] observed that intrusion de-
tection systems have difficulties in detecting novel attacks without an unacceptable
level of false positives. To address this, a group of data mining techniques (e.g.,
statistical and clustering) were applied to data from off-line network connections,
to supplement the real-time sensors. Different techniques where applied to the net-
work connection data and a meta-classifier used to combine the results. This is said
to enable activities such as low and slow scans, slowly proliferating worm attacks,
and unusual activities of a user based on some new pattern of activity, to be handled,
but which are otherwise prone to generating false positives.
Many of the applications of data mining found in the literature were used in com-
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bination with other techniques. See, for example, Kumar and Spafford [132] on
Coloured Petri Nets, Bridges and Vaughn [24] on fuzzy data mining and expert
systems, and Soroush et al. [195] on ant colony based data miners for extracting
classification rules.
3.12 Hybrid Approaches
Guerer et al. [84] describe a hybrid approach combining an expert system, a neu-
ral network and case based reasoning techniques for fault management. The expert
system is employed to filter network alarms, which are then correlated with a neural
network. The CBR system analyses the correlated alarms in order to identify the
faults that have given rise to the alarms. A further CBR engine is then used to sug-
gest a plan for fault correction. The results of executing this plan are subsequently
added to the case base for later use. Although intended for fault management, the
basic principles of event correlation could equally apply to intrusion detection. The
authors considered the combination of techniques to provide superior flexibility and
capability for tackling fault diagnosis in large networks.
Taniguchi et al. [204] combined a feedforward neural network, trained through su-
pervised learning, with a Gaussian mixture model and Bayesian networks. The spe-
cific application was fraud detection based on billing records. The neural network
was used to classify subscribers based on summary statics. The Gaussian mixture
model essentially considered a probabilistic model of past and current subscriber be-
haviour to detect anomalies. The Bayesian networks approach was then employed
to describe the statistics of a particular subscriber and that of various fraud scenar-
ios. Sterritt and Bustard [200] use Bayesian belief networks to supplement a rule
based system. Jiang and Cybenko [112] observe that attacks against networks and
network resources often involve multiple steps and therefore most single event IDSs
register high false alarm rates. They address this using Kalman filters and Bayesian
estimation methods. They further proposed a Process Query System (PQS), that is
able to scan and correlate distributed events according to the users’ high-level pro-
cess description. This approach was also used in the detection of Internet worms
by Berk et al. [21]. Endler [60] also explored a combination of neural networks
and statistical approaches, in this case likelihood analysis, for intrusion detection.
The neural network implemented misuse detection, whilst the statistical approach
facilitated anomaly detection. Zhang et al. [230] describe the Hierarchical Intru-
sion DEtection (HIDE) system for anomaly detection. The system is organised into
layers, with each layer consisting of Intrusion Detection Agents monitoring the ac-
tivities of host or network. A statistical component maintains a reference model of
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network activities with which it compares reports received, and produces a ‘stimulus
vector’ that is then fed into a neural network based classifier to determine whether
it is anomalous.
Bridges and Vaughn [24] used a hybrid of fuzzy data mining and expert systems,
where fuzzy data mining addresses anomaly based intrusion detection and misuse
detection is achieved through conventional rule based techniques. The anomaly
component searches for deviations from recorded patters of normal behaviour. Ge-
netic algorithms are used to tune the fuzzy membership functions and select an
appropriate feature set.
Marin et al. [155] present a hybrid technique that applies expert rules for the reduc-
tion of the dimensionality of the data, followed by initial clustering using a k-means
algorithm, and subsequent refinement of the cluster locations using a competitive
network, Learning Vector Quantisation (LVQ). They based their approach on the
notion that legitimate users can be grouped according to the percentage of com-
mands that they use within a given period. They use a nearest neighbour technique
for classification, making it possible to train without anomalous data. Initial results
showed an approximately 80% detection rate. Yang et al. [223] also consider the
combination of cluster analysis and expert systems. Data is collected from audit
trails or network traffic. The expert system is used to identify intrusion and gener-
ate an alarm if found or remove the data if not. After some preprocessing, cluster
analysis is used for anomaly detection. Intrusion rules are then extracted, and the
system is able to adapt prior unknown intrusions to known intrusions.
Pan et al. [175] use a combination of back propagation (BP) neural networks and the
C4.5 decision tree algorithm to analyse TCPdump data for misuse detection. The
general notion is to exploit the different classification capabilities of each technique
for different attacks. Their experiments did confirm that each approach is better
able to distinguish certain attack types than the other. Yu et al. [227] combined
neural models, a back propagation network and a Cellular Neural Network (CNN),
referring to the hybrid as BP/CNN. The approach is said to offer high detection rates
whilst reducing false positives.
Ping et al. [180] present a distributed security framework for ad hoc networks, that
combines immune systems and multi-agent methods, with an effort to be scalable,
distributed and adaptable. The immune system element allows it to detect unknown
attacks and provides adaptive learning abilities.
Chebrolu et al. [32] observe that some features of the data that systems use to detect
intrusion patterns may be redundant. They identify input features that are consid-
ered important using Bayesian networks (BN) and Classification and Regression
Trees (CART), as well as a hybrid. Empirical results suggest that selection of sig-
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nificant input features is indeed important in the design of efficient and effective
detectors.
Peddabachigari et al. [177] consider two hybrid approaches for modelling intrusion
detection systems. The first combines decision trees (DT) and Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM) to form a hierarchical model (DT-SVM). The second combines indi-
vidual base classifiers with other machine learning approaches. The performances
of these hybrid approaches were evaluated on the KDD-Cup99 data set, and showed
that the hybrids offered improved accuracy.
Hanemann [86] describes a hybrid approach comprising two reasoning engines –
one rule based, the other case based. The case based reasoning module (CBR) is
employed as a backup in case of incorrect modelling. This work is considered in
more detail in 4.3.
3.13 Other Approaches
This section considers a number of approaches that are best treated outside of the
previous classifications. Some of the notions have already been mentioned in the
preceding sections, although from a different perspective.
3.13.1 User Profiling
The technique of user profiling assumes that access to a system can be monitored
and that use of system functionality is both available and recordable. This in turn
means that a user’s typical usage of a system can be deduced, represented in some
way, and stored for later consideration. Subsequent use of the system by the same
user can be compared against this ‘profile’ and atypical system use can be recog-
nised. This notion is employed in many commercial systems to detect anomalous
system use that might be representative of, say fraudulent activities. Examples are
payroll systems that flag unusual payments and bank clearing houses that recog-
nize so called normal financial behaviour against which abnormal transactions can
be recognised. In the context of IDS applications, Hilas and Sahalos [97] describe
a statistical learning approach that creates user profiles for intrusion detection in
telecommunication networks. Their approach employs the usual assumption that
user profiles are constant for the same user, and as such, comparisons could be
made between the normal profile and test profiles to isolate attacks. This technique
is dependent critically on access to the system being user based. In a sense this
means that an aspect of event aggregation has already been performed by relating
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different transactions to the same user. Systems that are not user centric would need
to perform this aggregation stage and would not, therefore, be amenable to user
profiling approaches.
Erbacher and Frincke [61, 69, 71] describe a method for analysing visually network
and computer log information. This approach was based on the premise that each
user’s behaviour was fundamental to determining their intent and activity. It was
also stated that visual analysis of the user’s behaviour is adaptive and difficult to
counteract. The logs are examined to identify and particular attack and, with vi-
sualisation, it is possible to examine an individual’s activity as it is occurring and
thereby determine immediately the attack type. It was stated that visualisation tools
can aid in the reduction of false alarms and also detect previously unnoticed patterns
of intrusions.
Coull et al. [42] employ a bioinformatics inspired paradigm where a modified se-
quence alignment algorithm is used to detect masquerade attacks in a network. Mas-
querade attacks occur when a user password and other login information is obtained
by an intruder. The authors attempt to draw an analogy with the way sequence align-
ment is used to determine the similarity between two DNA or protein sequences in
the area of bioinformatics. Their approach applies a semi-global alignment and a
scoring system to measure similarity between a sequence of commands produced
by a potential intruder and the signature of the user (i.e. the sequence of commands
made by a legitimate user). Results suggest that this approach offers an effective
combination of high detection rate with low false positive rate.
3.13.2 Application Profiling
Another profiling approach was presented by Wagner and Dean [213] based on an
analysis of an application’s normal behaviour in contrast to a user’s normal profile.
They were able to automatically derive a model of a system application’s behaviour
using static analysis of logs of the application behaviour. They proposed a lay-
ered model where a very high level or coarse view of application behaviour was
determined down to a fine grained model of particular activity. The advantages and
disadvantages of this approach are identical to those of the user profile technique.
Liao and Vemuri [145] use a k-Nearest Neighbour (kNN) algorithm to classify pro-
gram behaviour as either normal or intrusive. Application behaviour is determined
by the frequency and types of system calls. This technique was evaluated using a
subset of the 1998 DARPPA audit data. The results found the technique to be ef-
fective in detecting intrusions, and achieving a low false positive count. However, it
was highlighted that if an intrusion did not reveal any abnormalities in the frequency
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of system calls, it will not be detectable by this approach.
Sekar et al. [189] also base their approach on application system calls and capture
both short term and long term relationships among system calls, therefore perform-
ing more accurate detection. Finite State Automata (FSA) were used to represent
these sequences. Primitive data is composed of the system call name and the pro-
gram point from which the system call was made, given by the value of the program
counter. Each distinct value of the program counter indicates a different state of the
FSA, whilst the system calls correspond to the transitions. The number or length of
the system call sequences was not limited. This approach was evaluated using file
transfer protocol, web access, and network file system protocol data. The results
suggest that the FSA learning algorithm converges quickly, has low memory and
runtime overhead, and delivers a high detection rate and a low false positive rate.
Yin et al. [226] presented an approach for anomaly detection based on the Markov
chain model and the linear prediction approach. Linear prediction is used to extract
features from the system calls of privileged processes, and the Markov chain model
is created based on these features. The key step in implementation was the selection
of features that best described the user or system usage patterns so that non-intrusive
activities would not be classified as anomalous. This method was evaluated with
data obtained from the University of New Mexico and MIT Lincoln Labs and the
results show that making comparisons between the probabilities of the intrusion
and that of the normal application is useful for detecting intrusions when normal
behaviours have been modelled.
Other work related to application profiling includes that of Ghosh et al. [77] using
Elman neural networks and Kosoresow and Hofmeyr [128] using FSAs to model
the temporal domain of application behaviour. In both cases the consequent IDS is
claimed to be effective.
3.13.3 Information Retrieval
This technique is related to the idea of data mining but rather than using machine
learning techniques to index data these are created by other techniques; see, for
example, Bloom filters [22], where data is efficiently compressed and encoded for
data transmission. Anderson and Khattak [9] presented an approach to intrusion
detection, where audit trails are indexed by file inversion. This in effect completely
replaces all datum items in a file with an index to the datum, thereby creating a file
of index with a supplementary file of data rather than a data file with a supplemen-
tary index. Anderson and Khattack argue that this enables even the most obscure
and, importantly, small attacks to be recognised. A clear disadvantage must be com-
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putational, because of the need to invert the audit data files, which implies that the
approach may be appropriate if used in an off-line environment, but has drawbacks
if applied in real time.
3.13.4 Event Aggregation
Julisch [115] describes a system that turns alarm cascading into an asset by cluster-
ing alarm events and thereby finding the primitive event that initiated the problem.
They argue that it is then more feasible to address the problem once the root cause
is identified, and their approach was aimed at solving the problem of intrusion de-
tection systems overloading their human operators by triggering many alarms each
day. It was further contended that the alarms that occur persistently account for
90% of the alarms triggered by IDS applications. They further observe that these
persistent root causes are problematic because they cause event cascades and can
therefore distract the intrusion detection analyst from spotting more subtle attacks.
Consequently they argue, alarms should be filtered by identifying, isolating and
removing the most predominant and persistent root causes.
Tedesco and Aickelin [205] describe a method for detecting alert flooding attacks.
Their approach was able to reduce alert throughput during the attacks by detecting
when a flood is occurring and then adjusting to the threat and making the IDS more
precise. They also demonstrated how compression techniques such as run length
encoding (RLE), can be used to ensure that the important information about the
attack is still logged. They were able to group the many related alerts that make up





In this report, the misuse that is considered is that which can be effected over a set
of data channels, i.e. it is network based. More precisely, it is understood that there
will be in some sense normal traffic and that occasionally there could be abnormal
traffic, and that the abnormal traffic is assumed to be misuse. This abnormal traffic
could be composed of many different data types and could be constructed in many
different ways. It is further possible that there could be many data streams within
the network and that normal and abnormal traffic could occur over these streams.
Another sophistication could occur within the definition of abnormal traffic. It is
possible that traffic may only become abnormal when certain data appears in more
than one data stream. That is to say, that normal traffic may occur in one stream
but with particular data appearing in another stream this traffic could then become
abnormal. This leads to the idea of abnormal traffic occurring within multi stream
data transmissions.
To understand this situation one must recognise the data streams within a system
and the type of data that they could carry. It is then necessary to characterise what
constitutes abnormal or normal traffic. For misuse detection, normal traffic is de-
fined as the absence of abnormal traffic, whilst for anomaly detection, abnormal
traffic is defined as the absence of normal traffic. Hence, it is not necessary to de-
fine abnormal and normal traffic separately. From these basic notions it is feasible
to proceed to an understanding of the idea of events within a data stream. These
are dependent in their turn on the idea of tokens and how these can be represented.
Abnormal traffic then becomes the existence of a set of events over a set of data
streams within a specified time frame. Finally, the process of event correlation be-
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comes one of determining how a machine1 can be fed information that will allow
it to make a determination regarding the normality or otherwise of the data of a set
of streams within a specified time frame. Passing information to the machine will
require discussion of data representations. It is also possible that this data could be
structured and it may then be necessary to prescribe a representation that includes
the essential features of the data content together with its structural context. An
intelligent machine that can perform an abnormality determination will need to be
trained and attendant considerations must be given to the construction and content
of a training set. The performance of the machine obtained from such a set will be
dependent on the distribution of normal and abnormal data within the training set.
Broadly, then, event correlation is the process of identifying significant system
events by recognising combinations of fundamental or more primitive events. Fur-
thermore, event correlation should enable the essential characteristics of such com-
binations to be aggregated into a single compound representative event. Eventually
these aggregations should be recognisable as system misuse or as some form of
attack upon the system.
Event correlation takes place in the context of a computer system, which may be as
simple as a single application running on a single computer or could be as complex
as a multi-functional distributed application running across a network of connected
computers. In the case of a distributed system the atomic events could originate
from many different functional modules executing on any of the host computers, or
from any part of the network infrastructure. Typically, these fundamental events will
be the result of monitor programs that deliver output streams consisting of telemet-
ric data. This data can be interpreted in terms of atomic events and consequently
fed in some way to the event correlation system. Alternatively, it is feasible that
sub-functions of the event correlation system execute on each node within the dis-
tributed system. This configuration implies the consequent problem of coordinating
the separate event correlators, which in turn has an implication for distributing the
output of these correlators across all the nodes of the system. This, incidentally, is
the motivation behind approaches based on mobile agents.
There are certain features and characteristics of the event correlation process that
are in a sense generic and not related to particular system hardware topologies or
application implementations. This chapter begins with a description of the intrinsic
nature of event correlation. This involves a distillation and summary of much of the
terminology that is prevalent in the literature. Further it involves erecting an abstract
description of a the event correlation process. The importance of this becomes
clear when proceeding to discuss various solutions to the event correlation problem.
1Which, for our purposes, is taken to mean some machine based on AI techniques.
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A generic description allows an implementation to be considered in the context
of this generic model. This in turn allows seemingly quite different systems to
be indirectly compared and contrasted with each other by comparing each with a
different abstract or generic model.
It is also important in the context of this research to understand the techniques that
were employed to construct the correlators. This is so because the techniques will
imbue the correlators with characteristics that are inherent within the technique. For
example, using artificial neural networks demands that an effective representation
is created for a compound event. Rule based systems do not necessarily need such
a representation because the compound event is understood atomically, i.e. as a
collection of parts. In the case of the neural network it would usually be necessary
to have a holistic view of a compound event, perhaps to compare against known
malicious events with some form of fuzzy comparison.
Finally, a taxonomy of event correlation solutions obtained from the research liter-
ature is derived, where the particular generic characteristics and the techniques em-
ployed for the implementation of each are known. A brief examination of a number
of correlators, either commercial or well known open source implementations, is
included in Appendix A.
4.2 General Considerations
This section explores some general issues relating to event correlation. Consider a
networked system where a fault has occurred. Further, assume that this system is
monitored and that events within the system are alerted in some fashion. In many
cases event alerts will represent so called normal behaviour. In other cases they
may clearly indicate a bad failure of the system. In yet other situations the events
may only take significance when they occur in the context of further system events,
i.e. they are significant when correlated with other events. If system alerts are
thought of as either a single event or, as described, possibly a set of events, then it
is understood that there is a clear issue of fault or alert recognition.
It is also feasible that some faults can lead to alarm cascades or event showers.
Clearly a sensible approach to the analysis of such a collection of alerts is to corre-
late those that are related to the same underlying cause. Then, if possible it would
be desirable to replace the multitude of events with a single alert that contains the
essential characteristics of the underlying problem. This of course comes with the
attendant issue of finding a suitable representation that signifies the fundamental
characteristics of the problem. This is an issue of event aggregation.
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Finally, the seriousness of the problem must be considered, and what actions must
be taken for its rectification. Thus, tackling the general event correlation problem is
really about answering the following questions:
• What constitutes an alert?
• How is it recognized?
• Does it consist of many correlated events relating to the same problem?
• How can these correlated alerts be aggregated?
• What actions must be taken as a consequence?
So, there are clearly separate issues of recognition, correlation, representation, ag-
gregation and action.
At this stage some initial definitions are made that are significant within the subse-
quent discussion. The necessity to find a primitive event (if possible) is referred to
as finding a root cause. In this case there is an implicit assumption that the events
form a causally connected tree structure and the root of that tree is sought. In re-
ality, of course, there could be more than one root cause, and then the problem is
one of dealing with a mathematical lattice structure. These ideas can be important
when formal methods approaches are used to create event correlators. Briefly, a
root cause exists when a fault or problem occurs in a distributed networked sys-
tem that can give rise to many consequential alarms that also apparently indicate
a system fault. The root cause refers to the original problem that is the cause of
the consequent dependent problems. For example, a network channel may become
inoperative. As a consequence an FTP session may time out which is flagged as a
fault in a system journal. There may be many other faults raised as a consequence
of the failed channel. However, the root cause is the failed channel and not any of
the subsequent dependent problems. Brown et al. [26] observe
One of the most significant challenges in managing modern enter-
prise systems lies in the area of problem determination – detecting sys-
tem problems, isolating their root causes, and identifying proper repair
procedures.
There is also the consequent idea of root cause analysis, which refers to the task
of determining the root cause from a set of apparently related problems that occur
within a distributed system. Note that there may be more than one root cause, which
will happen when the set of problems contains some that are independent.
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This distinction is clarified at this stage because there seems to be a tendency in
the research literature to refer sometimes to root cause analysis and sometimes to
event correlation. Here, the clear distinction is made that root cause analysis is a
part of event correlation. For example, event correlation also includes the task of
event aggregation which forms no part of root cause analysis.
4.3 Previous Research and Solutions
In the following sections, important work from the research literature is highlighted.
Sources have been organised chronologically then thematically, charting the pro-
gression of various pertinent lines of research.
1995
Hasan et al. [94] argue that the power and robustness of event correlation systems
varies considerably and that a formal specification of the system is necessary to en-
able effective comparisons to be performed. They present a formal method based on
a combination of causal and temporal information within the context of the topology
of the monitored system. They contend that the importance of Event Correlation
Systems (ECS) have triggered the development of a number of systems and refer to
Sheers [190], Kliger et al. [124], Jakobson and Weissman [109], and Hasan [93].
They claim that their formal system is compelling because:
• It is sufficiently general to encompass many of the possible architectures and
approaches to ECS design.
• It is scalable. For example, temporal relations are incorporated by a natural
extension of the language.
• It is associated with a proof system that enables very strong characterisations
of system behaviour.
• The event relationships described within the language are effectively com-
putable.
2000
Lo et al. [149] proposed two event correlation approaches that are based on the
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coding scheme presented by Yemini et al. [225], and these were applied for han-
dling the identification of faults in communication networks. They described the
causality graph model which is a technique used to describe the cause and effect
relationships between network events. In their approach, the notation scheme in-
volved transformation of the information in the correlation graph into a set of codes;
one code per problem. Next is the event correlation stage which involves seeking
the problems that cause the observed symptoms. In the first of the two schemes they
proposed, the event correlation is achieved in the selection process and followed by
the identification process, while in the second scheme it is done in two phases, the
codebook selection phase and the decoding phase. Simulation results show that
these schemes are able to identify multiple problems at a single cycle but that they
are also susceptible to noise.
Asaf Adi [3] describes a system called Amit that performs event correlation and
aggregation. They position this within applications they refer to as reactive, which
they define as applications that respond to events by triggering alerts. They extend
the domain of applicability of alert systems to include any application that reacts to
events. For example e-commerce, system management and command and control
applications. They argue that there is a requirement for middleware systems that
implement so called ‘push technology’. This is technology that has the ability to
transfer information as a consequence of an event instance.
2001
Krugel et al. [129] presented a specification language for defining intrusions as
distributed patterns. The system models intrusions as patterns of events that occur
at different hosts. It consists of collaborating sensors arranged at differing positions
in the network. A peer-to-peer algorithm, known as Quicksand, for detecting these
patterns of events was also presented. The different hosts in the system run a Quick-
sand sensor, which is made up of several local intrusion detection units (LIDU),
which are responsible for gathering events, and an event correlation component that
receives the streams of events from the LIDU. In addition, there is also a control
unit that the system administrator makes use of for system configuration. The sys-
tem was evaluated using fault tolerance and scalability as metrics and was found to
be satisfactory. Fault tolerance indicates the percentage of distributed patterns that
can still be detected, whilst scalability is described by both the total network traffic
between all nodes and total network traffic at a single node.
Al-Shaer [6] presented a group management framework for event monitoring based
on the IP multicast standard for distributed correlation. The multicast is able to
dynamically reconfigure group structures and membership assignments at run-time
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depending on the requirements of the event correlation that allows for optimal de-
livery of multicast messages between entities. It was added that this framework pro-
vides techniques for solving agent state synchronisation and the bootstrap problems
in distributed event monitoring. Some advantages of this approach include inter
alia the support for dynamic and scalable monitoring of information dissemination
to agents, the provision of a fine-grain group communication that enabled the agents
to disseminate monitoring information based on the event correlation tasks, and the
support for an agent synchronisation protocol that ensures state consistency of the
agents during group communication. However, a limitation of this approach is the
possibility of creating too many groups that may consume much of the resources.
Albaghdadi [153] uses object oriented concepts to encapsulate event functionality
within a class structure, and also leverages object orientation inheritance capability
to provide scalability. Graph theory and coding techniques are utilized. To ad-
dress the area of event correlation, Albaghdadi points out that AI techniques have
been used by Appleby et al. [11], Jakobson et al. [108], Sheers [190], Wietgrefe et
al. [218], and Weiss et al. [216]. Causality graphs are used by Kliger et al. [124]
and Yemini et al. [225]. In particular this research is an extension and development
of the research reported by Yemini. Albaghdadi reports that Hasan [94] utilised
graph theory and propositional relations and that Finite State Machines (FSM) and
probabilistic FSMs were used by Wang et al. [214]. Albaghdadi assumes that an
event has the following structure:
• Reason for the event. This could be a type or an error code and may have
additional detailed information.
• The source of the event. In a distributed system this is the network node that
logs this event.
• The date and time of the event.
Events are considered to be primitive in the sense that they can be thought of as an
alphabet. This leads to the idea of event words, which is defined as a concatenation
of events without regard to arrival sequence. For example, if {e1e2e3 · · ·} is a set of
possible events then e1e2e3 and e2e3e1 are equivalent words. Further, multiplicities
are ignored and only single event instances occur in words. Let Σ represent the
entire spectrum of possible events and therefore the complete alphabet. Also Σk











In this case Σ+ is the set of words that might be constructed from one or more
events of Σ and is the maximal set of words from the system under examination.
An event pattern can be composed of many events which may be contributed by
many different objects throughout the system. In this context an object is something
autonomous that can give rise to events. It is made clear that there is a many–to–
many relationship between patterns and events.
The correlation procedure is composed of two processes.
1. Local correlation where an object generates events that are caused by
changes in the state of the object and possibly as a result of external stim-
uli. This maps very neatly to an object oriented paradigm where the objects
are class instantiations which exchange messages with other objects.
2. Global Correlation which combines the outcomes of local correlation to ob-
tain a higher level view of system behaviour. This looks a little like a form of
aggregation.
The correlation process is directly related to finding patterns that exist given the
occurrence of a set of events. Since the relationship is many–many it is quite pos-
sible that many patterns may be identified given a certain event set occurrence. It is
reported that neural networks have been used to perform this procedure. Reference
is made to the SNNS – Stutgart Neural Network Simulator with an approach along
the lines described by Yemini et al. [225]. A correlation matrix can be created with
the columns representing possible patterns and the rows representing events. A ‘1’
in the element cij means that the ith event is contained in the jth pattern. This gives
a set of binary valued vectors that can be learnt, presumably by an MLP). In order to
compensate for a noisy environment, a match between a recognised vector and the
rows of the correlation matrix is effected by a scalar product metric used between
normalised vectors. This technique is then discussed in the contexts of local and
global correlation and also within the context of a temporally evolving system.
For local correlation, the topology field within the event is used to identify the event
source. This event is pushed onto the event queue associated with the particular
source. In object oriented terms each source becomes an object and the event queue
is associated with this object. Each queue has a system dependent length and if
necessary old events are dropped from the event queue. Initially this new event is
marked as uncorrelated. For global correlation the authors introduce the concept
of a correlation zone. This is an aggregation of objects or event sources. Zones
cannot raise events and are not the source of events. However they are recursive and
allow for hierarchies of zones to be constructed. Rules can be associated with zones
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enabling a comprehensive rule based system to be erected. In conclusion, the object
oriented class concept is used to encapsulated network node event processing and,
further, to naturally model correlation zones as recursive object instances. Simple
vector normalised scalar products are used as similarity measures.
Appleby et al. [11] report on collaborative research between Appleby, at IBM’s T. J.
Watson Research Center, and Steinder at the University of Delaware. In this paper,
they describe the ‘Yemanja’ event correlation engine. This is based on a model
of the computer system and employs a rule based correlation kernel. The authors
argue that commercial correlation engines (circa 2001) suffer from the following
disadvantages:
• They possess hard coded network connectivity information.
• Entity dependencies are also hard coded.
• The system model is traversed from all event sources. By this they mean there
is not a central organised information base.
• Inability to integrate device attributes with events, which makes root cause
analysis difficult.
• Failure to effectively correlate events over different time scales.
The distributed networked application is composed of entities, which are devices
or possibly logical/conceptual entities. Each entity has a problem behaviour model
which contains problem scenarios. In many respects these equate in other sys-
tems to rules. Scenarios consume events in the sense that events are recognised
as forming part of a scenario. The scenarios publish further events, which can be
consumed (the authors’ terminology) by other scenarios. Entities can be grouped
hierarchically which admits the concept of an event level. Entities correlate events
at a specific level. In general, producers are unaware of which entities consume the
generated events. This model is intended to allow greater flexibility and to facilitate
the addition of new entities to the overall model. In conclusion, the Yemanja prod-
uct was, at the time of publication, in use in a commercial application. The authors
conclude that the consumer/producer design of the entity classes, the hierarchic de-
sign of the inter-entity relationships and the independence of the rule based analysis
from the system topological information, makes the system flexible and fast.
Steinder and Sethi [199] are a source of many recent publications. This paper de-
scribes fault localisation and gives a selected taxonomy of techniques that are used
in the design and implementation of algorithms. Fault localisation is a process
of isolating and recognising faults that cause observable malfunctions of managed
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systems. The word ‘managed’ in this context means systems where normal and
abnormal service functionality is monitored. Associated with fault localisation is a
particular vocabulary. They define
• An event as an exceptional condition within a managed system.
• Faults or Root Problems as basic events that are immediately recognisable
and can be directly managed.
• An Error is a consequence of a fault and is defined as a difference between an
actual condition and an expected theoretical condition. A condition is a value
of some measurable quantity.
• Symptoms or Alarms are external consequences of failures.
This vocabulary, which is consistent with those terms adopted by the software engi-
neering community in respect of testing and reliability, is then employed to describe
how failures can cause fault cascades and collections of related and connected faults.
Consequently the need for fault or event correlation and aggregation.
2002
Vaarandi [209] presented a lightweight and open source tool for rule based event
correlation called the Simple Event Correlator (SEC). This is a platform indepen-
dent tool said to be able to deal with the complexity and size issues of other event
correlators. SEC is configured via a number of files, each of which contains one or
more rules. It produces output events by executing shell commands specified by the
user. A wide range of correlation rule types are supported, as previously described
in section 3.3. Morin [167] argues that event correlation can only be performed
effectively when there is a comprehensive model of the system within which the
correlation is to be performed. In particular the authors contend that the contextual
model should contain information relating to:
• System characteristics, which combine the topology of the system with the
functionality of the nodes within the network. Further information is en-
coded that determines allowable message paths and allowable message types
exchangeable between nodes.
• System vulnerabilities, specifying the types of attack of which the system
must be particularly aware.
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• Monitoring Tools, which are used and are available to collect the information
upon which event correlation can be performed.
• The Events, which are the lowest level event instances.
Further, they propose a formal system that can be used to model the rules that deter-
mine when events are malicious or anomalous. Rather like a formal logical system
the context provides the semantic framework within which semantic interpretation
can be performed whereas the formal rules provide the syntactic rules for the formal
system. The formal language is a derivative of Vigna’s model [212]. The system is
tested against three types of event correlation.
• Aggregation of alerts that refer to the same host or system node.
• Identification of nodes or hosts that are vulnerable to an attack.
• Reduction of false positives by analysing the reaction of the security tools that
could possibly react to a particular attack.
The authors emphasise that this system (referred to as an M2D2 model) is an attempt
to provide responses to the three issues of
• The large number of alerts that are provided in any meaningfully sized sys-
tem.
• The quality of these alerts.
• The consequent diagnosis provided to the system managers.
Their approach integrates details of the environment with the description or rules
determining the anomalous event descriptions and uses a formal language to spec-
ify those rules. Three examples are given that show how the formal language can
be used to perform effective event correlation, or, perhaps more precisely, event
aggregation.
2003
Benferhat et al. [20] contend that IDS systems are expected to recognise simple
single event attacks as well as complex multiple event attacks. As an example of
the former they describe the so called ping of death attack that tries to effect a de-
nial of service by sending an excessively long IP packet. Alternatively, the Mitnick
attack is a multiple event attack that involves the following stages.
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• First, an intruder floods the host computer H.
• Next, the intruder sends spoofed SYN messages to a server S which claim
to have originated from H. When S send a SYN–ACK message to H then
H would normally send a RESET message to close the connection. But this
does not happen because H is flooded. In this case the intruder sends an ACK
message to open a TCP connection with S. In effect H is kept busy while the
intruder borrows H’s IP address for a set of spoofed messages to S.
• Now that a connection is opened with S the intruder can attempt further
ingress by, for example, trying an rlogin.
The authors argue that there are so many possible multiple event scenarios that it is
very difficult for an event correlation engine to make a judgement regarding which,
if any, is actually in progress. In order to simplify this congestion the authors pro-
pose a ranking system whereby the scenarios are given a weighting that is intended
to reflect the probability that a particular scenario will occur. In conclusion, the
authors argue that event correlation is fundamentally a rule based process.
Morin and Debar [166] propose a multi-alarm misuse correlation component that is
based on the Chronicles formalism. Chronicles are temporal models that represent
potential explanations of an observed system; they offer a high level declarative
language as well as a recognition system for monitoring dynamic systems, whilst
formalism enhances the quality of the diagnosis provided by the system as well as
allowing for reduction of the number of alarms sent to the operator. Chronicles
comprise of a set of time points, a set of temporal constraints between time points,
a set of events models, a set of assertion models, and a set of external actions that
will be performed when a chronicle is recognised. The models proposed in this
paper were not tested on live data but only on alarm logs. However it was noted that
chronicles were primarily designed for diagnosing failures in telecommunication
networks by analysing alarms issued by equipments.
2004
Jiang and Cybenko [112] analysed the application of control methods such as
Kalman Filters and estimation methods such as Bayesian estimation in the correla-
tion of distributed events for network security. It was remarked that attacks against
networks and network resources often involve multiple steps and therefore most
single event-based traditional Intrusion Detection Systems register high false alarm
rates. They further proposed a Process Query System (PQS), that is able to scan
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and correlate distributed events according to the user’s high level process descrip-
tion. This approach was also used in the detection of Internet worms by Berk et
al. [21].
Totel et al. [206] presented a language driven signature based event correlation sys-
tem for intrusion detection. The language known as ADeLe is used to defining
correlation properties, and aims at combining all of the knowledge available for
an attack in one high level description. The ADeLe language correlation process
makes use of filters that describes the events or alerts that must be used as elemen-
tary elements in the correlation process. Correlation operators are used to define
the signature of the attacks. These are: Sequence, which facilitates the description
of a sequence of events; OneAmong, which defines a separation between the el-
ements during each detection; NonOrdered, which describes a signature in which
all elements are recognised without any order constraint; Without, which facilitates
the description of the way a negative signature is able to remove positive signa-
ture detection when a negative signature is detected; and Repeat, which permits the
description of a repetition of an event or an expression. As with other sets of corre-
lation rules, such as those of SEC [209], a need for flexibility and expressiveness is
apparent.
Jakobson et al. [107] presented a survey of event based situation analysis. They
argue for the integration of an event correlation system and a situation awareness
system, and proposed an architecture combining rule based spatio-temporal event
correlation and case based reasoning for understanding and managing events.
Hanemann and Schmitz [91, 92] present a service oriented event correlation tech-
nique for the correlation of reports from the system and/or users. It was identified
that different reports could have the same course and therefore reports could be
linked together and the process of analysing the reports performed once. The Mu-
nich Network Management (MNM) Service Model was used. This is a generic
service management model proposed by the MNM team, used for retrieving appro-
priate modelling of the necessary correlation information. The model distinguished
between client side and provider side roles, and consists of two main views, the ser-
vice view and the realisation view. This approach was evaluated using the e-Mail
service offered by a supercomputing centre.
2005
Hanemann [91, 92, 88] discusses the context of service level provision and the
consequences of failure to provide service levels in accordance with Service Level
Agreements (SLA) and Quality–of–Service (QoS) expectations. This paper de-
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scribes a method for automatically determining the impact of service failures. Ser-
vice failures are defined to be of short, medium or long term duration. In each case,
different actions must be taken as a consequence of the occurrence of such a failure.
This paper presents a framework and workflow within which and against which ap-
propriate actions corresponding to service events and failures can be determined.
This is in contrast to the more traditional human intervention technique. In sum-
mary, this paper deals with the question of what to do once a root cause has been
identified, which itself is the result of event correlation analysis. Hanemann [87]
again emphasises the difference between what is defined as resource events and
service events. The former mainly occur as a result of hardware or vendor firmware
code. For example, a link is up or down, a router has failed or not, or perhaps some
form of authentication failure related to the lower levels of the network hierarchy.
Service level events include, for example, customer reported problems. These oc-
cur at a much higher level than the network hierarchy. Even in some ways above
the application layer of the ISO model. Such events need to be correlated with the
underlying resource events. The root cause event will almost certainly come from
one of the resource events. This paper therefore describes a framework that enables
service and resource events to be aggregated and correlated.
Hanemann [89, 90, 86] later proposes a rule based reasoning engine to manage
event correlation. In addition, a case based reasoning engine is invoked to recog-
nise alarms and events that are not covered within the rule based system. The case
based system is then used to update the rule based system. Reference is made to the
HP Openview system, see section A.3. A distinction is drawn between network and
systems management faults or events, and service based events. The former are con-
nected intrinsically with the hardware and firmware of the distributed applications
and in these cases can even be specified as failure conditions attached to the hard-
ware or software specifications. Service based events on the other hand originate
from the needs of the customer and are usually formalised within a SLA. Often the
customer may cause a service event by pointing out that the supplied service fails
a QoS guarantee. This paper uses an example scenario to demonstrate the current
position regarding service fault diagnosis. It further examines how event correla-
tion underpins this fault diagnosis. The hybrid architecture proposed in this paper
is described and using the example it is shown how this facilitates fault diagnosis
through event correlation. The service scenario is based around the Leibniz Su-
percomputing Center (LRZ) which acts as an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The
particular service used as an example is the e-Mail service provided to the staff and
students of Munich universities. Of course, this service is dependent on a hierarchy
of underlying services such as domain name servers, routers, mail transport agents
etc. The fault management is entirely user centric, where events are related to help
desk calls raised by dissatisfied users. HP Openview (section A.3) is available to
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perform event correlation and to identify root causes. No automated system exists
to connect related events and correlate customer reports to these events. This pa-
per relates the qualities of different event correlation approaches to some erected
criteria that are considered important for service based systems. The criteria are:
• Maintainability. Service provision is an extremely dynamic and volatile ap-
plication. Any event correlation system must be easily updatable or amend-
able to new conditions and circumstances.
• Modelling. The relationships inherent in service provision applications can
be extremely complex because there is a deep hierarchy from inter service
dependencies to network level dependencies. Any model must be sufficiently
flexible to enable this complexity to be encompassed.
• Robustness. The complexity of service related applications also suggests
that the event correlation model may be incomplete. In this case the event
correlation system must be able to cope with unknown or previously unseen
event circumstances.
• Performance. Although service type events do not occur with the potential
frequency of, for example, network based events the performance must still
be considered since network type events may become part of the event model
and consequently will need to be accommodated.
Notice that these criteria may not be appropriate for all event correlation scenarios,
being specifically targeted at service based systems. However, there may be some
overlap of characteristics. Hanemann offers the following table as a guide to the
usability of event correlation techniques against the above criteria.
Maintainability Modeling Robustness Performance
MBR -2 +2 0 0
RBR -1 +1 -1 +1
CBook -1 -1 0 +1
CBR +1 +1 +1 -1
MBR refers to model based reasoning, RBR is rule based reasoning, CBR is case
based reasoning and CBook refers to CodeBook systems. Of course, as is argued
in this paper, advantage may be gained by using combined or hybrid approaches.
For example RBR plus CBR has been proposed by Jakobson et al. [107] to manage
highly dynamic systems, where in this instance the RBR and CBR run in parallel.
As a consequence of the previous analysis, a hybrid architecture is proposed in this
paper. The components that comprise the service event correlator are:
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• The ServiceMIB which is a manually created database of service and resource
dependencies.
• The RBR which takes rules automatically generated from the ServiceMIB.
Events input to the RBR are matched against known rules.
• The CBR, a case based reasoner that attempts continuously to match the
events to a known case. If this is successful and the result is in agreement
with the RBR then the root cause is found with some justification. Previous
cases and their consequent root causes are configured manually.
Observe that the events that are input to the service event correlator are already
aggregated and correlated externally in the sense that some degree of service event
correlation is performed by the external service management software. The interest-
ing situation is when the RBR fails to match and the event is forwarded to the CBR.
In some situations an adaptation to an existing case will match the event. This adap-
tation together with the current ServiceMIB is then used to update the ServiceMIB
which in turn becomes the source for an update of the RBR.
4.4 Techniques
A wide variety of techniques have been employed for the solution of the event cor-
relation problem [52, 51, 142, 66]. A frequently employed approach to an inte-
grated, intelligent fault diagnosis is by means of rule based systems [146, 147, 153].
These systems are often limited to simplified rules for event correlation and are in-
clined to be difficult to scale to large systems [66]. Connectionist and other AI
techniques [190] have been employed in an attempt to obtain self learning of the
complex correlation rules, but again these seem to suffer from problems of scala-
bility. Model based paradigms have been proposed [124, 225, 73, 216, 66] that it
is argued can overcome many of the problems inherent in scaling to large systems.
Steinder and Sethi [199] observe that event correlation techniques have been de-
rived from a selection of computer science paradigms. They list, among others, AI,
graph theory, information theory and automata theory. They offer a classification
hierarchy based on Katker and Paterok’s [118] analysis of the most often employed
techniques:
• Model based reasoning tools.
• Fault propagation models.
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• Model traversing techniques.
• Case based reasoning tools.
Appleby et al. [11] argue that the following six research areas are significant within
the field of event correlation. In particular they make a distinction between model
based systems and model traversing systems. In many cases this distinction is not
made apparent in other reported research.
• Rule Based.
• Model Based Reasoning Systems.
• Model Traversing Systems.
• Case Based.
• Fault Propagation Models.
• Code Book Approach.
Rule based systems [148, 219] are synonymous with expert systems. Model based
reasoning [108, 172] and model traversing systems [114] are slightly different as-
pects of a similar idea. Both rely on a model of the underlying system. Model based
techniques relate the events to the topology of the system which is encoded within
the model whereas model traversing create a model of the relationships between the
topological entities of the system. Event correlation is performed via correspon-
dence with the model’s relationships. Case based reasoning is heavily promoted
by Lewis [143]. Fault propagation models, Hasan et al. [94], are similar to model
traversing but in this case the model is a highly abstract view of a combination of
the topology and the causal relationships of the system entities. Codebooks, Yemini
et al. [225], are essentially look up tables.
From these observations techniques are classified into the taxonometric tree de-
picted in Figure 4.1.
4.4.1 AI Techniques
There are at least two significant models that come under the heading of AI tech-
niques. The first are those where intelligent behaviour is obtained by actual con-

















Figure 4.1: Taxonomy of detection mechanisms
approach assumes that the behaviour of the machine is predetermined by the sub-
tlety and extent of the programming from which it was constructed. In other words,
it depends on how good the expert was that built the AI. The second covers those
models where the AI obtains its so called intelligence through a process of learning.
Such paradigms cover all of the procedures where a machine is trained to perform
some function on some form of exemplar set of data, usually referred to as the train-
ing set, and is then expected to perform the same function on previously unseen or
novel data. The function performed is often some type of pattern recognition but
is not restricted to this action. Expert systems most definitely adhere to prepro-
grammed paradigm, whilst neural networks employ the machine learning model.
1. Programmed systems. This is a broad and now somewhat ill defined area
but effectively the knowledge about the system and the valid inferences that
can be adduced from this are preprogrammed into an abstract model. There
are many specific techniques that are derived from this broad approach.
(a) Expert Systems The knowledge about the system and the logical rela-
tionships that hold intrinsically with this knowledge are usually obtained
from experts in the field of enquiry. The knowledge inherent in an ex-
pert system is deemed to be either surface knowledge which is derived
from experience, or deep knowledge which implies an understanding of
the underlying principles of the system.
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(b) Rule Based Systems Approaches that rely on surface experiential
knowledge are referred to as rule based systems. These systems em-
ploy a forward chaining inferential system, i.e. they proceed from ac-
cepted knowledge by applying selected rules to obtain inferred or de-
duced knowledge. Rule based systems do not require complex under-
standing of a system and work well for small systems. Challenges en-
countered with rule based systems include their difficulty in coping with
unseen problems. This is because they are often hard coded or precon-
figured and therefore incapable of adding to their experiential knowl-
edge base. More importantly they do not have the ability to generalise
from known situations.
(c) Model Based Approaches This paradigm is predicated on the existence
of a model of the underlying system [108]. The model makes available
information on the topology, both physical and theoretical, of the system
and allows failure conditions in different parts of the system to be corre-
lated. Due to the deep knowledge of the system these approaches have
the ability to solve novel problems and with appropriate organisation the
model is adaptable and expandable.
(d) Code Book Techniques These techniques use information theory [154]
and were first employed by Yemini et al. [225] in the SMARTS In-
Charge system. Fault propagation patterns are represented by a code-
book [124, 26] where, for each fault a distinguishable code is created.
In a deterministic model a code can be a sequence with each element
taken from the set {0, 1}. Codes are generated dependent upon a sys-
tem model and a fault model. A causality graph is used to generate the
propagation model from which an intermediate code is generated. The
graph is reduced by pruning cycles, removing unobservable events and
indirect symptoms that cause other events that are already in the graph
and do not therefore add any additional information. After reduction
the graph contains only direct cause effect relationships between fault
events and symptoms. The graph is then converted to a matrix repre-
sentation where the rows are indexed by symptoms and the columns are
indexed by fault events. The element pij contains the probability that
fault event ej causes symptom si. In a deterministic model pij ∈ {0, 1}.
This matrix is referred to as the correlation matrix.
2. Machine Learning
(a) Case Based Reasoning These systems make their determinations based
on previous examples of similar situations [143], referred to as cases.
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The problem is to find a similar case to the one currently under consid-
eration and the central issue is to define in this context what is meant
by similarity. Often this will be related to how the situations or cases
are represented and will sometimes be a simple Euclidean distance met-
ric. Case based systems are resilient to changes in the topology of the
system and by their nature are easily adapted. The challenge in deploy-
ing them in event correlation systems is the representation of temporal
relationships between an arbitrary number of events that form a case.
Some work has been done on adapting CBR to deal with sequences of
concurrent events from multiple sources [157], and CBR has also been
employed as part of hybrid correlation engines [89, 90, 86] .
(b) Neural Networks Neural networks are a machine learning paradigm
modelled on the biological behaviour of the brain and the neurons within
the brain [95]. The capability of a neural network is not computa-
tionally limited and its functionality and behavioural characteristics are
determined by the interconnections of the neurons, its topology, and
the weights associated with these connections. Usually the topology
is fixed and the weights are modifiable. The weights in a sense form
the knowledge container. The attraction of neural architectures is that
they do not function on the basis of a formal representation of the prob-
lem, but instead derive their own internal representation by distilling the
essence of the problem from the training set. This therefore enables
neural networks to generalise to unseen data, assuming that the train-
ing set is sufficiently representative of the domain. Cannady [28] and
Wietgrefe et al. [218] discuss the use of artificial neural networks and,
in particular, feedforward networks for misuse detection. This approach
does not facilitate event correlation for events widely distributed in time.
Rather, a feedforward neural network with backpropagation training is
used as a pattern recogniser for signature recognition. Neural networks
are classed as an adaptive system and do not suffer the problems of ex-
pert systems where rules are precoded and difficult to change. A neural
network can at least learn from a training data set what it is supposed
to know. One drawback, however, is that this knowledge is not evident
in the configuration of the network. Their functioning is taken on trust
once they have been trained and tested.
(c) Decision Trees Decision trees are generally thought of as a form of
machine learning. Essentially, a tree is created, the use of which enables
decisions about a particular data set to be performed. Traditionally these
decisions might be an allocation of the data into a particular class. An-
other possibility is to predict the value of some variable depending on
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the predicted values within a given data set. Learning for decision trees
involves creating the tree itself. Use of the tree is simply a matter of
traversing the tree, making a decision at each node point depending on
the value of the attribute of a specified data item. Classically the algo-
rithm for training the tree is called the ID.3 algorithm and is based on
the principle of entropy maximization. This algorithm is well described
by Mitchell [164] and Luger [152]. This paradigm was used by Pan et
al. [175] as a hybrid approach combining neural networks and decision
trees within the intrusion detection process.
4.4.2 Model Traversing Techniques
The problem of event correlation can be considered through the use of abstract
models [74]. The idea is that a thorough understanding of the topological and func-
tional properties of the computer system facilitates an understanding of the types
of intrusion that could be attempted against this system. Typically, this approach
expects there to be significant topological and/or functional dependencies. In this
solution an abstract simulation model is built, and used to predict the profile of
alarm propagation and dissemination throughout the system. By comparing actual
profiles with the model it is possible to detect the root cause of the alarm. In many
cases these models are constructed from formalized mathematical systems [73] and
indeed this must largely be the case in the model based approach. Logical connec-
tions between distributed entities within the system are represented by relationships
in the formal model. When a fault occurs, these relations are inspected to establish
impacted entities, which may themselves raise further alarms. By this technique a
form of event or alarm correlation is performed. These techniques are described
by Gruschke [81, 82] and Katker and Paterok [118]. The algorithms necessary to
support and implement model based systems must often be distributed throughout
the networked system [158]. One approach by Fabre et al. [66] employs a domain
oriented design where a supervisor controls each domain and is responsible for cre-
ating a coherent local view, in the sense of agreed interface protocols, of its own
domain. Flagged events are then distributed throughout the system.
1. Formal Methods These techniques include formal grammar systems that
use the fundamentally recursive nature of grammar expressions to represent
complex hierarchic event dependencies. Other techniques use formal logic
systems to specify the rules in a complex model based system. This has been
attempted in the context of cellular phone networks using extended logic pro-
gramming by Frohlich et al. [73]. See also Eskin et al. [64], where a ge-
ometric framework for unsupervised anomaly detection is described. Vert
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et al. [210] begin the process of describing intrusion detection mathemati-
cally. This centres around a mathematical description of the event correla-
tion mechanism. Jakobson et al. [107] describe an architecture for reasoning
about event based dynamic situations. Cuppens [44] has actually created a
formal language he calls LAMBDA used to create system models for event
correlation. The name is deliberately reminiscent of the rather more abstract
invention of Lambda Calculus [19].
2. Other Methods Zerkle et al. [228] consider a data mining approach. Es-
kin [63, 64] considers the probability distributions of anomalous events occur-
ring over noisy communication channels. Gruschke [81, 82] uses dependency
graphs as a tool for event correlation specification and analysis. Frincke et al.
[70, 69, 71] realised that event correlation systems could be more effectively
constructed if the event dependencies and underlying system models could be
efficiently visualized. This developed into something of a side issue but nev-
ertheless stands as a significant tool during the development and subsequent
verification of IDS applications.
4.4.3 Hybrid Systems
It is difficult to find an AI technique that is applicable to all of the issues raised by
event correlation engine design. Where, for example, a rule based system would
function well once the supplied events have been sequenced and their essential fea-
tures have been extracted it is not a good choice of technique for actually perform-
ing the extraction or sequencing. Further, as noted by Hanemann et al. [91, 92,
88, 87, 89, 90, 86], rule based engines, once configured, are not adaptable to novel
anomalous event combinations. Hanemann et al. observed that event correlation is
a complex problem and could, perhaps, best be approach by combining the capabili-
ties of several AI techniques. They describe the combination of rule based signature
recognisers with case based reasoning systems that provide a defence against new
and unseen attack profiles. The CBR system is also used to update and inform the
rule based recognisers. Section 3.12 presents a range of hybrid systems approaches.
Very often, these attempt to find a combination of technologies to implement both
misuse and anomaly detection paradigms, e.g. using a rule based system for the
detection of known misuses, and neural networks for learning normal behavioural
patterns for anomaly detection.
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4.5 Discussion
A comprehensive review of the literature shows that event correlation is a diffi-
cult problem with the most common approach to a solution oriented around rule
based systems. Rule based systems certainly suffer from the disadvantage of be-
coming out of date and pure machine learning approaches suffer by being unable
to grasp a large enough temporal picture. The approach of Hanemann et al. was to
use a hybrid system where rule based techniques were expected to provide a front
line defence against intrusion and a case based reasoning system attempted to un-
derstand anomalous behaviour as a fuzzy match with previously known behaviour.
The hybrid approach suffers predominantly in the complexity of the management




The previous chapters have covered approaches that are primarily used to detect
misuse in the network, i.e. to specify whether there is a misuse in the network or
not. This chapter goes one step further in the network management process and
focusses on the localisation of misuses. Typically the misuses of interest are related
to faults or performance management.
To realise the localisation of a fault normally requires some kind of knowledge.
Thus, most approaches which can be found in the literature do include knowledge in
their process. Mostly, the network topology is taken as a basis for the approach, but
there are other kinds of knowledge that may help to offer good root cause hypothe-
ses. The quality of knowledge based approaches normally depends on the accuracy
of the given knowledge. Consequently, it would be advantageous if the knowledge
could be automatically derived from the network or if techniques can be applied to
adapt the knowledge when there are changes in the network configuration.
A number of surveys can be found in the literature covering localisation in network
management, and sometimes more specifically in fault management and perfor-
mance management, such as [198], [159], [98], [173] and [131]. These overviews
normally make a distinction between different kinds of localisation approaches.
Figure 5.1 (taken from [198]) gives a classification of existing approaches. How-
ever, some approaches fall into two or more categories. As shown, Steinder et
al. distinguish between AI techniques (such as rule based systems, model based
systems, case based reasoning and machine learning techniques), model traversing
techniques (which were mentioned in Section 4.4.2) and fault propagation models
(which can also be used in model based techniques).
As previously mentioned, rule based approaches are widely used in the area of
network management, despite the fact that they still have a number of disadvantages.


























Figure 5.1: Overview of localisation techniques
describe patterns of faulty situations. There are two general approaches for rule
based systems referred to as deductive and abductive methods. The former infers
new knowledge from the existing knowledge base, and in so doing, tries to infer the
observations made. The latter approach takes the observations as assumptions and
generalises from given rules (i.e. reverses the rule implications). The knowledge
bases of these two methods are different.
Normally, forward chaining algorithms are used in the inference engine. Within
each step the applicable rules (i.e. rules whose conditions are fulfilled by the current
state) are looked up and executed. Through this, possible candidates for the root
cause are generated. In [151] the distinction between core (i.e. general) and custom
knowledge is made for the purpose of reducing the effort of rule generation, due to
the possibility of reusing core rules.
In general, rule based approaches are easy for human beings to understand and,
consequently, an explanation of the diagnosis can be easily extracted. However, they
are not able to learn from experience, i.e. they normally repeat faulty diagnoses over
and over again. Further, unknown problems (which are not covered by the rules)
cannot be handled. This means that all problems have to be known and specified
in advance, which in the case of networked environments is not possible due to the
dynamic environment. Another difficulty is that network configurations are hard
coded in the rules. If a configuration changes, all affected rules have to be detected
and updated. This is a non-trivial problem.
However, the problem of knowledge adaptation can be partly overcome by model
based approaches. Model based localisation is a knowledge based approach that
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uses some kind of model as the knowledge base. As mentioned in previous chapters,
there are three ways to model a network: to model the normalities, to model the
abnormalities, and to model both the normalities and abnormalities of the network.
The advantage of modelling the normalities is that unknown misuses are covered
with such a model. If only the abnormalities are modelled, all possible misuses
have to be considered in the model. However, modelling the normalities is much
more expensive than modelling the abnormalities.
When modelling the knowledge in a model, the adaptation of the specified network
configurations is much easier, because it is only stated in one place. Due to the
deep knowledge of the domain, more demanding patterns can be detected. Another
advantage is that the decisions of the system are explainable. In addition, model
based systems have the potential to solve novel problems, because they normally
provide a better abstraction of the problems or they have a model of the normality of
the system. However, model based systems are founded on the assumption that the
knowledge that is saved in the knowledge base is correct. Otherwise the generated
root cause hypotheses would not be accurate. The main disadvantage of model
based systems is the knowledge acquisition, which is time consuming and typically
requires expert involvement. In any event, it is normally impossible to provide a
complete model of the network and it is a demanding task to keep any model up-
to-date. Thus, some approaches try to automatically generate and update the model
from the network itself.
Case based reasoning combines normal knowledge based approaches (such as rule
based and model based) with the capability of learning from past experience. Within
these approaches, past situations that were solved successfully are stored in the case
base. If there is a new fault situation it is compared to previous situations on the
basis of a similarity measure. The most similar experienced situation is taken and
its solution is adapted to the current problem situation. The main disadvantage of
case based approaches is that it is hard to define a similarity measure. In particular,
the expressiveness of the similarity measure is limited, since it is the same for all
cases. The time complexity of these approaches is also normally high and they can
therefore be problematic if real time performance is desired.
It may be that a good performance and an adaptation to changing network structures
can be achieved by keeping the case base size to some constant level. This requires a
drop out strategy for the cases, e.g. cases that lead to many false classifications, the
oldest cases, or those that are in a crowded area according to the similarity measure
can be dropped to constrain the case base size.
During the last few years researches in the area of network management have fo-
cussed on distributed approaches. When applying a distributed technique the di-
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agnosis problem is broken down into smaller sub-problems, which often can more
easily be solved from local diagnosis components. In [159] Meira distinguishes
between three common distributed architectures:
• Centralised localisation refers to a hierarchical architecture, where all local
problems are handled by local managers (or agents) and domain overlapping
faults are covered by one central manager.
• Decentralised localisation where local managers are responsible for faults in
their domain as well as problems that go beyond their domain. In that latter
case, the central manager coordinates the fault localisation process.
• Distributed localisation refers to an approach where the localisation process
is realised only by local managers, i.e. no central manager exists. Thus, the
degree of autonomy is most significant in this architecture.
The distributed approaches have several advantages compared with centralised sys-
tems. Principally, the flow of management data in the network is greatly reduced.
In addition, the complexity of the fault diagnosis should be reduced due to the de-
composition of the problem. A further potential advantage is that the agents may
be capable of initiating corrective actions even if the communication to others is
lost. However, one potential disadvantage is that the global view on the problem
can be lost if there is no central component, and this has to be made up through
communication between the local components.
5.1 Rule Based Localisation
Elmzabi et al. [59] propose a fuzzy rule based approach for the realisation of perfor-
mance management. They improved a former fuzzy rule based approach with the
output being linearly related to the rule’s input. The new method suggested by the
authors has a fuzzy output, meaning that the output also expresses the quality of the
generated hypothesis even if the latter is not linearly dependent on the input. The
approach consists of two steps. The first includes the initialisation of clusters (each
cluster corresponds to a fuzzy rule). The second step employs a genetic algorithm
to optimise the parameters of the fuzzy model. The approach was tested in a local
area network to predict the state and evolution of traffic in the network.
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5.2 Model Based Localisation
This section introduces some existing model based localisation approaches, which
use graphs, logic or probabilistic models as knowledge representations.
Fabre et al. [66] suggest an underlying model based on a Petri net to realise fault
management. Within this Petri net the network elements are described as nodes and
the failure dependencies are the edges between nodes. Root cause candidates are
identified using failure propagation based on the network elements’ dependencies.
The authors also propose a distributed version of their approach, which is realised
by using local supervisors that complement the missing failure propagation steps of
one another.
Ka¨tker et al. [117] propose a generic model for fault management to integrate all
relevant aspects of the different network layers (the network, the system, and the
service management layers). By using a dependency graph they model services and
their dependencies. Fault isolation is realised by performing fault propagation on
the dependency graph. The authors define some restrictions on the network, which
must be met. The graph should be directed, acyclic and finite, i.e. it has to be a
tree. It is assumed that only one fault exists in the network at a time. If a service
S1 depends on another service S2 it fails if the service S2 fails, i.e. a dependency
expresses a failure dependency.
Katzela et al. [119] introduce a model for fault localisation, which is also based on
the dependencies between the network elements. These dependencies are expressed
in a dependency graph, and they are provided with the probability with which one
network element is faulty due to another network element with which it is directly
connected. The fault localisation is performed on the basis of these probabilities,
i.e. the elements with the highest probability are possible candidates for the root
cause. Additionally, an alarm cluster is defined. Each alarm cluster contains those
network elements that can invoke this specific alarm.
In [119] the network model is tested with two different fault localisation approaches
(one for independent failures and one for dependent failures). The approach is based
on some assumptions concerning the network. Thus, only one fault at a time is
assumed to be in the network. In addition, the alarm has at least to provide the
identity of the object that has sensed the malfunction. The authors suggest that the
dependency model is general, flexible (i.e. it can easily be adapted, although it is
not described how the adaptation should be performed), simple (i.e. sufficiently
rich, but still manageable) and a similarity measure can easily be found.
Steimann et al. [196] propose a logic based approach that tries to reduce the prob-
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lem of knowledge acquisition by taking most of the information from the OSI Man-
agement Information Base (MIB). Certainly, the information in the MIB is not ex-
pressed in logic; in addition, information about the behaviour of the network has
to be provided by the user. To ease the specification of the behaviour Steimann
et al. introduce a specification language, which they claim is easy to use. Both
the behaviour specification of the user and the information from the MIB are then
transformed into order sorted logic. Then the authors define a transformation from
this first order logic representation to propositional logic. This reduction can be
realised, because all network elements have to be known in advance and thus the
network consists of a finite set of managed objects.
After the process of knowledge acquisition, fault detection and localisation pro-
cesses can be performed on the basis of observations in the network. For every
observation the consistency of the model is tested and possible failure models are
generated using their DRUM-II algorithm. The DRUM-II algorithm is a model re-
pair algorithm which tests if there is an inconsistency in the model and generates
a set of consistent models representing all minimal diagnoses. Further informa-
tion can be found in [72]. One advantage of this approach is the adaptation of the
knowledge base in case of network configuration changes which are inconsistent
with the knowledge base. The main problem of this adaptation is that the dynamic
structure of the network cannot be adequately handled, i.e. all instances have to
be known in advance. In addition, temporal patterns are not taken into considera-
tions and thus cannot be detected. The approach also works on some assumptions
made concerning the network. First, a closed world assumption is made regard-
ing the information from the MIB. Second, the network structure has to be acyclic,
and third all network elements have to be known in the initialisation phase. These
assumptions are restrictive and narrow the applicability of the approach.
Kumar et al. [130] introduce an abductive reasoning approach for performance man-
agement, which employs knowledge of the network in the form of a hyper-bipartite
network; a graph where symptoms, faults and hypotheses are represented as nodes
and related through edges. The reasoning approach applied to this model is a com-
bination of abductive and deductive reasoning, which has the advantage that it can
handle noise in the data (due to the abductive reasoning) and does not generate too
many hypotheses (due to the deductive approach).
Barros et al. [49] propose an model based approach that employs different kinds
of knowledge to allow a deeper analysis of the problem. For example, the network
knowledge consists of eight different knowledge levels (e.g. one level is the spatial
distribution level, which describes how the network elements are distributed over
the area, buildings, rooms, etc.). Besides the network knowledge, which is repre-
sented using ontologies, there should be knowledge of the network management
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and its functionality, such as failure classes, MIBs and diagnostic knowledge (e.g.
which diagnosis technique should be applied in which situation). Problem solv-
ing methods are applied to reason about the knowledge to isolate the possible fault
hypotheses. A disadvantage of this approach is that all this knowledge has to be
acquired, which could be excessively time consuming. The approach also assumes
that there is only one single fault in the network at a time.
Bronstein et al. (HP) [25] employ local diagnosis to consider the health of a net-
work element. This local diagnosis, referred to as health awareness, is realised
using Bayesian networks. The authors propose a generic model based on the data
of sensors of the specific network element. The sensors are mostly network element
independent, however, some sensors might be designed just for one specific type
of network element. The model of the health engine is divided into four different
layers. The first layer refers to the sensors of the network element. The second layer
(‘measures’) collects the information provided by the sensors. The architecture al-
lows information to be stored of any type in these measures. The amount of past
data stored here is measure specific. A given sensor can contribute data to several
measures. The third layer is the evaluation layer. Its task is to evaluate given mea-
sures and create an opinion on the network element’s health. The top layer employs
reasoning based on Bayesian networks to the different opinions of the evaluation
layer and combines them. The accuracy of every evaluator is included in this rea-
soning process. This accuracy was initially defined by an expert in the conditional
probability tables (CPT). The paper proposes an extension by employing Voting
EM to this approach. Voting EM is a learning approach that can be used to realise
online learning to initialise and improve the CPT, i.e. the definition by experts is
then no longer needed.
Rish et al. (IBM) [184] propose an alternative to event correlation, namely active
probing. A probe is a test that collects information about specific network elements.
With this information one can diagnose whether any of these network elements is
faulty or not. An example of a probe is the ping command, but there are other
frameworks that offer better possibilities for probing, i.e. probes that are tailored
for this specific purpose. Rish et al. also describe a knowledge based approach. The
knowledge about the network is restricted to the given probes and their relationships
to network elements, i.e. which network elements are covered by this probe. The
beliefs about the system state are held in a two layer Bayesian network and can be
updated using probabilistic inference.
According to the authors, probing can already be found in the literature. The new
approach differs in that it offers ‘active’ probing, i.e. that the probes that will obtain
the best information are selected at run time. This offers the possibility that previ-
ously obtained knowledge can be included in the probe selection process. If a fault
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is detected, the active probing selects the next probe that has the highest information
gain. After receiving the result and updating the beliefs concerning the system state,
this step is repeated until no more information can be obtained. The conditional en-
tropy specifies the amount of uncertainty. The goal of active probing is to reduce
this entropy within every step until the entropy equals zero. The authors also offer
some extensions for active probing to reduce some its drawbacks. One drawback,
for example, is that the system is assumed to be static during diagnosis. In dynami-
cal systems this is normally not the case. However, this can be partly overcome by
using Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) or the sequential multi-fault approach,
which is an efficient approximation to DBN’s. The authors show that active prob-
ing reduces the number of needed probes compared to existing probing approaches.
However, the quality of active probing is not compared to non-probing approaches,
such as event correlation. Different from some previous approaches, this approach
only assumes that there are no more than s (a constant to be specific by an expert)
simultaneous faults in the network. The main advantage of this approach is that it
can handle noise in data, which can occur in networks due, for example, to packet
loss. It is also suggested that a combination of event correlation techniques and
active probing is possible, and that some disadvantages of active probing can be
overcome by this combination.
Tang et al. [203] propose such an approach (Active Integrated Fault Localisation -
AIR), which combines active probing with passive fault localisation (such as model
based reasoning). They extend the often used symptom-fault map where the faults
and their symptoms are saved along with the probability of a fault causing a spe-
cific symptom. This map is extended with actions (probes), which can be used to
test the existence of specific symptoms. Instead of specifying the relationship be-
tween faults and probes, this model relates symptoms and probes. The approach
consists of three different components that fulfil different functions. The first is the
fault reasoning module. This is a passive fault localisation approach that collects
incoming events from the network elements and correlates them for the generation
of root cause hypotheses. The fidelity evaluation component measures these hy-
potheses regarding their plausibility (the hypothesis that assumes the fewest faults
and whose faults most probably cause the observed symptoms is assumed to be the
most likely). If the fidelity value of the most probable hypothesis is satisfactory
(beyond a given threshold) the fault localisation process terminates. Otherwise, the
action selection component tries to prove this hypothesis. For this purpose, probes
are send to obtain the missing information or to underline the existence of a symp-
tom. Consequently, noise in the data (such as the loss of events and consequently
symptoms) has less effect on the accuracy of the approach, because unobserved
symptoms can be detected when employing the active probing.
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By combining passive fault localisation and active probing, some of their individual
weaknesses can be addressed. The passive fault localisation is normally susceptible
to noise in the data. This can be overcome by using active probing, which obtains
additional information concerning the existence of symptoms. Active probing lacks
the ability to track intermittent network faults and performance related faults, and
normally does not scale well. These disadvantages can be overcome, because the
passive fault localisation approach is applied first. Tang et al. contend that AIR in-
creases the detection rate and minimises the false positive rate, as well as reducing
the fault detection time compared to passive fault localisation techniques. Accord-
ing to the authors, the AIR approach also scales well, even in large networks, and is
noise tolerant. The approach can be applied to probabilistic as well as deterministic
models. Active probing may offer the possibility to gain automatic feedback from
the system and thus reduce expert involvement.
Huard (AT&T) [104] introduces a basic probabilistic approach for fault manage-
ment. The knowledge base is realised by a Bayesian network containing an acyclic
model of the possible faults and their dependencies. Based on this knowledge the
approach generates the possible root cause candidates, which should be confirmed
during further testing.
Steinder et al. [197] suggest an approach employing a symptom-fault map as a
probabilistic model. Similar to [203] the causality relationships between faults and
symptoms are saved along with their probability of causal implication. In addition,
the probability of independent failure is associated with every fault. This approach
assumes that a symptom may be caused by only one fault at a time, which natu-
rally reduced the applicability of the approach. The main advantage is that it is able
to provide a set of most likely hypotheses at any time. Since the approach works
incrementally, these hypotheses are updated according to new obtained knowledge
(i.e. of newly received events) and refines them step-by-step. All hypotheses are
ranked according to a measure of ‘goodness’. To be able to handle spurious symp-
toms and to incorporate positive symptoms (i.e. if a failure symptom is disproved
or was not observed at all) the authors extended the above approach further. A flag
that indicates if a symptom is observable or not and the probability with which a
symptom might get lost is required. Further, the probability with which a symptom
may be spuriously generated needs to be defined. These probabilities are included
in the ranking of the hypotheses. One clear disadvantage is that the different proba-
bilities may be difficult to define and the whole approach relies on their correctness.
Two heuristics are applied to reduce the complexity. For the first, it is assumed that
the hypothesis with less faults are more probable than others. The second heuristic
limits the number of hypotheses that are generated. Consequently, the less probable
hypotheses are left out of further proceedings. As an effect, the optimal solution
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may not be found, but the complexity of the approach is reduced.
5.3 Case based Localisation
Melchiors et al. [160] propose an approach that uses case based reasoning for fault
diagnosis. This is based on Trouble Ticket Systems (TTS), which are widely used
in this domain and provide information on the occurred alarm (like events in OSI
networks). Based on previous failure cases, and further domain knowledge (such
as failure classes and their properties), similar cases are detected and adapted to the
present situation. This approach also employs an additional learning component that
improves the similarity measure. Additionally, the similarity measure is computed
depending on the diagnosed failure class, i.e. the similarity measure does not have
to be completely general but can be tailored for a specific failure class.
5.4 Decision Trees
5 Chen et al. [36] propose an approach that makes use of request logs which have
to be labelled, i.e. every request has to be labelled if it was faulty, and if so it
has to be provided with its root cause. On the basis of these request logs, they
build a decision tree that classifies the failed and successful requests. The failure
paths of the decision tree are then post-processed and root cause candidates are
extracted. For learning, the C4.5 algorithm and an information gain algorithm,
MinEntropy, was applied. Four heuristics are applied afterwards to filter out false
positives. The first is that leaves with successful requests are left out. Second, noise
in the data is filtered out according to a noise threshold: every leaf that contains
less failures than specified in the threshold is left out of further proceedings. Third,
nodes that can be logically subsumed by their successor nodes are merged together.
The forth heuristic ranks the candidates according to their degree of correlation with
failure. Within this paper the probability of independent failures is assumed to be
low. This approach was applied to localise failure in Internet pages and was tested at
EBay. The main advantage of the approach is that the time consuming knowledge
acquisition can be skipped and that an explanation for the decision can easily be
extracted. However, the false positive rate is still high (approximately 25%).
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5.5 Hybrid Approaches
Hanemann [86] proposes an approach for service fault management, i.e. a fault
management component that offers a user interface for customers and automatically
processes customer complaints. For this task the author proposes a hybrid approach,
namely a combination of a rule based and a case based reasoning. The rule based
component serves as the standard fault localisation approach. If the rule based com-
ponent is unable to offer a solution (due to incomplete knowledge), the case based
reasoning module is then used to overcome this problem. The rules for the knowl-
edge base should be automatically derived from the Service MIB. Only in some
cases should a manual intervention of the administrators be necessary. The derived
knowledge should normally include dependencies between the services themselves
and their dependencies on the network resources.
Nuansri et al. [171] propose a hybrid approach consisting of a rule based and a
neural network component. The neural network component (namely BRAINNE)
was used for knowledge acquisition. Its inputs were former log files (error messages
and their root cause) and it was used to generate corresponding rules that represent
this knowledge. The rule based component (namely NEXPERT) works on the basis
of the rule base generated by the BRAINNE module. It is used as the actual fault
management component, i.e. it receives the errors that have occurred, and generates
the appropriate root cause. To be able to react on network changes, the BRAINNE
module tests from time to time if there are new rules that can be obtained. If so,
these rules are added to the knowledge base, thus adapting the acquired knowledge
where necessary.
5.6 Distributed Localisation Approaches
Cheikhrouhou et al.[34, 33, 35] describe an approach where a multi-agent system
is employed to realise fault management. The authors explain the functionality of a
framework where intelligent agents can be adapted to a specific scenario by defin-
ing skills for the agents. These skills can be loaded onto the agent at runtime, and
correspond to a specific ability of the agent (such as monitoring, fault detection,
etc.). In addition, each agent is provided with general functionalities, such as com-
munication and skill management. A multi-agent system acts as a container. Thus,
the concrete realisation of fault detection can be exchanged by others. However, the
authors mention the BDI-architecture (Beliefs–Desires–Intentions) used for knowl-
edge representation within this approach. With this logical representation one can
express the network state on the one hand and the goals of agents on the other. Due
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to the distributed solution proposed here, the underlying data is filtered earlier and
the amount of data that has to be sent over the network can be reduced. Further, be-
cause of the skills, the framework provides a generic solution, which can be widely
used and easily adapted. It also offers the possibility to employ fault detection and
fault localisation techniques other than the BDI-architecture. The agents have a hi-
erarchical order, which means that they can be controlled and monitored by a central
position.
Garijo et al. [75] describes a framework for fault management which makes use
of a multi-agent system. The different tasks in a fault management system, such
as monitoring, diagnosis and user interaction, are realised by different agents. The
only interface to the network is realised by the Access Agent. This agent receives
the events from the network and provides operations to obtain further information
from the network. It is the only component that depends on the specific type of
the network. There are two interfaces to the outside: the User Agent and the Ex-
ternal Communication Coordinator. The User Agent represents the interface to the
network operator, i.e. the user of the system. Through this agent, the operator can
supervise the management process and can interfere using operations provided by
the User Agent. The External Communication Coordinator offers the possibility
to communicate with other Management Frameworks. The heart of the fault man-
agement framework is the Recognition Agent. This agent receives the events and
clusters them according to their presumed root cause. Then, a Diagnostic Agent
is created, which realises the event correlation for one cluster of events and which
generates root cause hypotheses. These hypotheses are verified by the Operation
Agent, which performs tests on the network elements involved (using their Access
Agents). The result (the probable root cause) is presented to the user thereafter. This
paper only describes the framework for a fault management system. Nothing is said
about the concrete realisation (for example of the event correlation). In addition,





This report has considered the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to the do-
main of misuse detection and localisation in telecommunications networks. Much
of the literature focusses on intrusion detection at a low level (e.g. based on TCP/IP
traffic), for which a diversity of AI techniques has been applied, from classical ap-
proaches (e.g. clustering and classification, and expert systems) to natural comput-
ing (e.g. artificial neural networks, evolutionary computation, and artificial immune
systems). A broad survey of such techniques and applications has been reported
and, although the literature is biased towards computer networks, the techniques
are considered to be equally applicable to telecommunications networks. This sur-
vey was followed by a more detailed examination of event correlation, as the ac-
cepted approach to misuse detection and localisation (in the general sense) based
on higher level sources of data, e.g. event logs or alarms from network resources.
There is less concentration in the literature on event correlation, and approaches
at this level are dominated by rule based systems, often pre-configured based on
expert knowledge. These suffer from a number of drawbacks, including lack of
generalisation and adaptability. Thus, the initial premises of the work, as laid out
in the introduction, were confirmed. Current approaches for the localisation of mis-
use sources were also considered. The majority of approaches were applied in the
area of fault and performance management and focussed on knowledge based tech-
niques. However, in recent years researchers have tried to combine learning and
knowledge based approaches or to realise distributed approaches. These seem to be
very promising directions for misuse localisation but still have a number of draw-




This report has covered a diversity of literature on the subject of intrusion detec-
tion, misuse detection and event correlation. The applicable techniques from the
domain of AI that can be identified from the literature include inter alia expert sys-
tems, case based reasoning, artificial neural networks, evolutionary computation,
swarm intelligence, artificial immune systems, and agent based systems, as well as
a wide variety of statistical approaches to clustering, classification and regression.
The main focus of this work for misuse detection is on event correlation, which,
unlike low level intrusion detection, does not enjoy such a variety of currently ap-
plicable tools and techniques; most systems being rule or state based. Drawbacks
with canonical rule based systems, of import in this domain, include:
• The need for a large knowledge base of rules for detecting known misuses,
often requiring considerable investment in expertise and knowledge engineer-
ing.
• The lack of generalisation ability to unseen misuses, with such systems being
built on the principle of misuse detection rather than anomaly detection.
• The lack of automated processes for adapting to new misuses and/or a chang-
ing environment.
• The interaction between rules in the knowledge base, which can make updat-
ing the system to cover a new misuse a non-trivial task.
• The need for house-keeping to purge the system of out-of-date or conflicting
rules.
As pointed out in this report misuse localisation needs some kind of topological
knowledge of the network. Consequently, most localisation techniques include
some form of additional in their process. However, it is still unclear how to shorten
the knowledge acquisition made by experts or how to automatically generate the
knowledge from the network itself. In recent years research has focussed on hy-
brid approaches that combine knowledge based approaches and learning, and on
distributed approaches.
It is evident from the literature, that these remain active research topics, and that
there are no canonical solutions, especially in the telecommunications domain where
the network topology can change frequently.
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6.3 Recommendations
The principal difficulty in developing an event correlation engine is the reliance
on rule or state based approaches. This is virtually dictated by the nature of the
problem to be solved. AI techniques are promising as they tend to offer, to varying
degrees, the ability to learn, generalise and adapt. Hence, one could seek to develop
entirely new architectures for event correlation based purely on contemporary AI
techniques. However, the dominance of rule based systems is not without reason
- they are, in essence, the only architecture currently capable of processing, with
any measure of success, the potentially complex temporal and causal relationships
required contemporary event correlation engine. A logical first step seems, there-
fore, to explore further opportunities for hybridisation of rule based systems with
more flexible AI techniques. Specifically, it is desirable to address the following
key issues:
• Automating the task of populating the knowledge containers prior to system
deployment.
• Enabling the generalisation of detection capability to unknown misuses.
• Facilitating the (semi-)on-line adaptation and optimisation of knowledge con-
tainers to:
– add or modify rules to counter false negatives
– remove or modify rules to counter false positives
– remove redundant rules to maintain a sensible knowledge base size (this
may involve a trade-off between factors such as detection capability,
knowledge base size and run-time performance)
It should be noted that these activities are not without user involvement. For ex-
ample, the initial population of knowledge containers would be based on training
data prepared by the user, and subsequent adaptation would require the system to
be instructed when false negatives or false positives occur.
From the field of AI, a variety of techniques could be explored to achieve these
goals. Based on the comprehensive review presented herein, the most promising
approaches for initial exploration would seem to be neural and fuzzy systems to re-
alise some measure of generalisation, and evolutionary techniques for both the ini-
tial population of the knowledge containers and subsequent adaptation and optimi-
sation. The ability of evolutionary techniques to cope with multi-criteria problems
may be of particular use when exploring the trade-off between different, potentially
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conflicting, objectives, such as minimising knowledge base size whilst maximising
detection capability.
These recommendations are not without precedent. Neural approaches have
been widely applied for the detection of known and unknown misuses (e.g. [29]
[76][139][37]), based typically on low level data. Evolutionary approaches have
been used to evolve rules for expert systems (e.g. [146] [144]), and also combined
with fuzzy systems (e.g. [80]). Other related techniques have also been used for
developing rules, such as particle swarm optimisation (e.g. [1]), although the gen-
eral notions are similar. Rule based systems have also been hybridised with other
techniques, such as case based reasoning [86], case based reasoning and neural net-
works [84], learning vector quantisation [155], and fuzzy data mining [24].
When moving away from largely deterministic systems, it is worth bearing in mind
the fundamental premises of the AI techniques involved; principally:
• That it must be possible to infer the output from the input, i.e. the data set
being processed must have the appropriate information content to arrive con-
sistently at the desired conclusions. This property is essential for learning.
• That similarity in the input space, however that might be measured, must
map to similarity in the output space. Note that the converse is not necessary;
different inputs could map to the same or similar outputs. This property is
essential for generalisation.
Whilst these may seem obvious preconditions, the nature of the alarm data to be
correlated for the identification of misuses, from frauds to faults, needs to be exam-
ined to confirm that these are satisfied before AI techniques can be applied with any
degree of confidence. In particular, the preparation of test data from which to derive
the initial population of the knowledge containers, should consider the ‘coverage’
of misuse types. Specifically, a misuse (as opposed to anomaly) detection mech-
anism, is not likely to detect unknown attacks that are fundamentally different in
nature from the known attacks on which it was trained. It should also be noted that
the more ‘flexible’ architectures, such as neural and evolutionary systems, reduce
the explanatory power of any detection system in which they are employed. A ma-
jor advantage of canonical rule based systems is that they can present the user with
the chain of reasoning by which they arrived at their conclusion. Other techniques,
such as case based reasoning, can offer some explanation based on similarity mea-
sures, whilst others are often unable to present any indication of why they reached
a particular conclusion. This is a natural dichotomy, rather than a weakness in the
techniques - if one requires the flexibility to learn, generalise and adapt, then the




The following sections briefly describe a number of ‘in use’ Intrusion Detection
Systems; that is, systems that have moved from theoretical investigation to imple-
mentation. This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, but rather to provide
a selection that exemplifies the evolution of IDS systems and the techniques used
for their development. The extensive research in the area of intrusion detection in
computer networks has led to a large number of practical systems, more so than in
the telecommunications domain, hence we have drawn some examples from con-
ventional intrusion detection systems. The systems outlined in this appendix are:
• DIDS Distributed Intrusion Detection System.
• HP Openview.
• LIDS Linux Intrusion Detection System.




Distributed Intrusion Detection System. Refer to Snapp et al. [192] for details. This
development is concerned with the so called ‘network user identification problem’
which addresses the issue of tracking a user who moves across a network from host
to host with potentially a new user id on each machine. An instance of this type of
misuse is the doorknob attack. Here an intruder’s objective is gain access to a system
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through an insufficiently protected host on the network, i.e. the attacker knocks on
as many doors as necessary until a weakness is found that enables ingress.
The DIDS architecture is a combination of distributed monitoring, subsequent data
reduction and central analysis. Hosts that do not possess a monitor function can
be protected by monitoring the network between hosts. This architecture was pro-
posed and implemented in 1991 and can therefore be considered an early example
of effective intrusion detection systems.
Inevitably, DIDS employs an a rule based system as its central event correlation
mechanism. This system was written in Prolog and the expression of the rules is
closely related to the intrinsic Prolog formalism. The rule based system requires a
fundamental model of the system which, in Prolog terms, means the existence of
a set of primitives or facts and a set of relations connecting them. Essentially this
is a semantic net forming a model of the system. Rules become superposed Prolog
relations derived from this net. The semantic model is layered, much in the style
of the ISO layered model that was gaining strong credibility at the time. The layers
are:
Level Name Explanation
6 Security State Overall network security level
5 Threat Definition of categories of abuse
4 Context Event placed in context
3 Subject Definition and disambiguation of network user
2 Event Representation of user action
1 Data Low level log data
It can be seen from this table how the process of event correlation involves a se-
quence of aggregation and correlation steps as moving up the table to higher levels
of abstraction.
The DIDS system was implemented on a network of Sun SPARC workstations. It
performed adequately according to Snapp et al. [192]. Improvements were possible
by using a different rule based generation system, as Prolog suffers performance
problems. The most significant defect was in the absence of a signature recognition
system.
A.2 FLIPS
Feedback Learning Intrusion Prevention System. According to Locasto et al. [150]
FLIPS is a host based system intended to augment perimeter type prevention mech-
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anisms like firewalls and IDS functions thereby implementing a defence in depth
policy. FLIPS is implemented as an HTTP server protection mechanism. Its prin-
cipal function is to prevent code injection attacks. Locasto et al. argue that an IDS
is a passive system, because it essentially performs a pattern recognition function.
They propose an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) which combines this function
with the objective of preventing the intrusion to the system. To facilitate this, they
contend that the system must incorporate feedback learning. This allows passive
pattern recognition functions to be updated with known or active attack profiles.
FLIPS consists of an anomaly based classifier, a signature based filtering scheme
and a supervision framework that enables instruction set randomisation (ISR). It
should be noted that the principal advantage gained from employing an IPS, and
FLIPS in particular, is to detect and prevent code injection attacks.
A.3 HP OpenView
HP Openview is a management software suite that provides a comprehensive sup-
port for IT infrastructure management. HP Openview consists of many modules and
one in particular, Event Correlation Services, is responsible for intrusion detection
within the IT framework. It employs a GUI based rule generation module that as-
sists with the generation of rules for the event correlation engine. Sheers [190] pro-
vides a description of HP OpenView. The system is distributed, since each separate
network unit is expected to perform local correlation and aggregation. The underly-
ing architecture employs networks of rules called nodes, through which events flow.
The rules could combine or aggregate events and contain a temporal dimension that
permits long separated events. An interesting feature is that the temporal sequence
is not one way. The correlation engine permits events to arrive in different temporal
orders. That is, it seems possible for a correlated event to occur backwards in time
but the engine understands that this is only a function of network delay causing
unusual sequencing of correlated events. The nodes form a circuit diagram and a
functional programming language is employed as a specification framework. The
correlation engine effectively executes the specification directly. Hanemann [86]
refers to this product and supplies the following active Web Site.
http://www.managementsoftware.hp.com/products/ecs/
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A.4 LIDS, Linux Intrusion Detection System
This section considers, for completeness, what appears to be an example of a freely
available IDS based around the Linux operating system. Unix type operating sys-
tems are constructed around a superuser model where there are ‘normal’ users with
local privileges and a user, often called root, with unrestricted access to all parts
of the system. Root is not subject to any of the restrictions of access that may
apply within the file system nor is root subject to restrictions regarding execution
access and system modification. In effect the user logged into root owns the system.
The Linux Intrusion Detection System (LIDS) is a modification to the Linux kernel
that allows many of the root privileges to be removed. Further, LIDS in fact im-
plements an access mechanism that enables privileges to be allocated on a needed
basis. A LIDS kernel also implements a TCP/IP port scanner. Although there are
many separate port scanners, the one provided with LIDS is strongly coupled with
the entire LIDS functionality. LIDS also prevents the indiscriminate installation of
software. Attempts to install port sniffers, for example, are rejected. It seems clear
that LIDS does not implement an event correlation engine and is actually an access
allocation mechanism combined with log scanners and comprehensive system mon-
itoring functions. In this respect LIDS is similar to many other freely available so
called IDS applications based around the Linux operating system. See for example
SNORT, AIDE, LOGCHECK, etc. The current Web site for LIDS is
http://www.lids.org
A.5 SPECTRUM
SPECTRUM is a commercial system from Concord Communications Inc. Concord
provides Business Service Management software with the objective of increasing
system availability be improving system reliability and implementing tight Service
Level Agreements.
http://www.concord.com/aboutus/
The SPECTRUM software manages the availability and performance of IT infras-
tructures and the consequent dependent services. It combines model based, rule
based, and something referred to as Policy Based approaches, in order to obtain the




SPECTRUM is composed of many connected and collaborating modules. Of par-
ticular interest is the approach taken to event correlation. This is managed by event
rules, examples of which are:
• Event Pair (Event Coincidence) This rule covers the situation when events
are expected to occur in pairs. These events do not need to be contiguous.
Of course, inductively, it is possible to extend pairs to multiple event occur-
rences.
• Event Rate Counter (Event Frequency) For example, if an event occurs a
certain number of times in a particular time interval it is abnormal. Denial of
service attacks certainly fall into this category.
A.6 SNORT
The following summary is take from the SNORT Web site.
Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection
system utilizing a rule-driven language, which combines the benefits of
signature, protocol and anomaly based inspection methods. With mil-
lions of downloads to date, Snort is the most widely deployed intrusion
detection and prevention technology worldwide and has become the de
facto standard for the industry.
http://www.snort.org
The SNORT package is a rule based system and derives its basic information from
the network layer. The rules are flexible, and are often developed and offered by the
software community in general. The Web site maintains a large set of validated and
verified rules for general use. It is possible to create bespoke rules and also possible,
and encouraged, to submit these to the SNORT management group as additions to
the publicly available rule set. The Web site maintains a large set of documents
including a FAQ. There are also many books available on this subject, for example,




Many of the ‘in use’ IDS applications described in this report have been extensively
tested using common or standard test data sets. Since these are referred to frequently
in connection with the review of artificial intelligence techniques, this appendix
describes the DARPA data set, and a derivation of this, the KDD-Cup99 data set.
These data sets consist of low level network events in various forms.
B.1 DARPA
The Information Systems Technology Group (IST) of MIT Lincoln Laboratory,
within the remit of a DARPA sponsored project, collected a standard set of test data
for the purposes of testing and evaluating Intrusion Detection Systems. In 1999
the evaluations were performed on a number of IDS applications. Measurements
of the probability of detection and probability of false alarms were obtained. MIT
provide an updated Web site containing the test data, documentation, descriptions
and publications. The URL for this is:
http://www.ll.mit.edu/IST/ideval/data/1999/
1999_data_index.html
As observed on this site
These evaluations contributed significantly to the intrusion detec-
tion research field by providing direction for research efforts and an
objective calibration of the state-of-the-art. They are of interest to re-
searchers working on the general problem of workstation and network
intrusion detection. The evaluation was designed to be simple, to focus
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on core technology issues, to encourage the widest possible participa-
tion by eliminating security and privacy concerns, and by providing
data types that were used commonly by the majority of Intrusion De-
tection Systems.
IDS applications could be tested within an offline or real time environment. Offline
tests used, for example, audit logs and TCP/IP dumps collected from a simulation
network. Real time tests were expected to operate within actual networks under
operational timescales. The IDS applications were expected to identify anomalous
and attack behaviour within a background of normal network activity. Documenta-
tion and related publications are also available from this site. The agency supplied
three weeks of training data. Only the second week of data contained attacks. The
remaining two weeks were provided to enable ‘normal’ activity to be sampled.
B.2 KDD-Cup99
This data set was used for the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining Tools Competition and is a version of the DARPA data set described above.
This was conducted in parallel with KDD-99 the Fifth International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. The objective of the competition was to
build an IDS application that was capable of distinguishing between normal and
anomalous network behaviour. The data was a simulation of a military network
environment. The Web site provides a detailed description of the required IDS
application, the full simulation data set, and a description of the attack data types
embedded within the otherwise normal activity of the network. The URL for this
is:
http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
Comprehensive details concerning the data set and the results of the competition
are provided by Stolfo et al. [201]. The data set is essentially a set of TCP/IP dump
data. The types of attack embedded within this data are:
• Denial of service, e.g. SYN floods attacks.
• Unauthorized access from a remote machine, e.g. guessing password.
• Unauthorized access to local superuser (root) privileges, e.g. various ‘buffer
overflow’ attacks.
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• Surveillance and other probing, e.g. port scanning.
In nearly all of these attack types the composite attack events are distributed, asyn-
chronous and atemporal, and as a consequence place considerable demands on the
underlying event correlation engines.
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